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PREFACE 
I gathered most of the data presented in this thesis as part of a collaborative 
research project funded by the Policy Research Action Group (PRAG). PRAG links 
academic researchers with community organizations. In this case, I worked with the 
Chicago Rehab Network (CRN), a coalition of 37 non-profit housing development 
organizations in Chicago. 
My research project with CRN grew out of the coalition's historical efforts to 
improve the environment for non-profit low-income housing development in the city. In 
1993, CRN led an organizing campaign to press for passage of the Chicago Affordable 
Housing and Jobs Ordinance. The campaign garnered signatory support from over 260 
community groups, churches, and other institutions in Chicago. In December 1993, 
Mayor Richard M. Daley agreed, after extensive negotiations with CRN, to increase 
spending for affordable housing in the city by $250 million over the successive five years. 
The additional funding was to be administered by the city's Department of Housing (DOH) 
under the direction of Commissioner Marina Carrott. In addition, an ordinance passed by 
City Council required DOH to formally report to the council each quarter regarding the 
department's activities and expenditures. Prior to the passage of this ordinance, no formal 
reporting procedure was in place. 
As a result, DOH produced reports for each quarter in 1994 and continued the 
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process in 1995. Commissioner Carrott formally presented these reports and provided 
oral testimony before the City Council Committee on Housing and Real Estate. At each 
of these hearings, the Chicago Rehab Network and its supporters testified to the 
committee regarding their concerns with the progress of the department's affordable 
housing efforts. As a research assistant for CRN, I produced written reports for the whole 
of 1994 and for the first two quarters of 1995 which highlighted the network's concerns. 
Most of the data presented in this thesis grows from these reports. All of the data that I 
use here is based entirely on numbers provided by the Department of Housing in their own 
quarterly reports. These are available to the general public from DOH, which is located at 
318 S. Michigan Avenue in Chicago. The department's current phone number is (312) 
7 4 7-9000. Of course, the department did not present their numbers in the way that I 
analyze them here. Using DOH's numbers, I developed the data in new ways, seeking to 
understand how well the department was meeting the housing needs of Chicagoans. 
In generating this thesis, I have thoroughly reviewed the data available in the DOH 
reports, refusing to accept the opinions of CRN at face value. Though the results of my 
analysis tend to parallel CRN concerns, I am confident in my findings because I have 
rigorously examined the data available and actively sought to disprove the hypotheses that 
I developed while working with CRN. 
Vl 
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My opportunity to explore in detail the expenditures and administration of city 
housing programs is rare. The City of Chicago Department of Housing only began in 
1994 to produce reports which provided the details necessary for this analysis. The 
department agreed to produce these reports after a coalition of activist housing 
organizations led by the Chicago Rehab Network (CRN) organized to demand additional 
city funding for low-income housing. In agreeing to provide an additional $250 million 
over five years for such purposes, Mayor Richard M. Daley also conceded to CRN' s 
demand that the Department of Housing produce highly detailed quarterly reports on its 
activities. 
Hence, analyzing DOH expenditures and programs in the detail presented here was 
not possible before 1994. CRN's victory provides an important opportunity for academics 
and housing activists. Pat Wright of the Nathalie P. Voorhees Center for Neighborhood 
and Community Improvement at the University of Illinois at Chicago crunched some 
numbers from the DOH quarterly reports, seeking a final count of the units the department 
subsidized in 1994. She did not analyze other aspects of the report, however. Besides 
this helpful but limited research and my own work, no analysis of the DOH quarterly 
reports has been conducted. The existing sociological literature has not dealt in detail 
with the role of local government in coordinating affordable housing programs, partly 
because the information has not been available. 
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Sociology has also tended to overlook local handling of affordable housing for a 
variety of other reasons. First, while federal involvement in housing production began in 
the 1930s, local governments only became active in the 1960s, when federal money for 
housing was offered to local entities. Moreover, as Lenz and Shaw (1993, p. 131) note, 
states and municipalities only began spending their own funds on affordable housing in the 
1980s. Indeed, according to Shaw and Lenz, the City of Chicago and the State of Illinois 
did not begin spending local money for such purposes until the late 1980s. Until very 
recently, then, local government acted entirely as "pass-through" bureaucrats. In this 
thesis, I present data that suggests that even "pass through" responsibilities are significant; 
when local government controls the distribution of federal money, its administrative 
capacity and political interest significantly affects the actual housing assistance produced. 
The fact that city and state funding for affordable housing is so recent, at any rate, may 
have encouraged scholars to disregard the important role that local government plays. 
Moreover, much of urban sociology in the United States has tended to consider 
housing needs to be the result of straightforward supply and demand in a self-regulating 
housing market ( Gilderbloom and Appelbaum 198 8). In this model, institutional actors 
such as city governments are considered peripherally important for understanding the 
operations oflocal housing markets. Negotiations between individual landlords and 
tenants, or individual home buyers and sellers, drive a market that - if unfettered .by 
regulation - is appropriately balanced to meet the housing needs of all consumers. Local 
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governmental policies such as taxation, bond issues, zoning ordinances, and capital 
improvement expenditures may affect how the market operates, but these affects are 
peripheral to understanding the basic workings of the market. Housing problems such as 
deterioration in certain neighborhoods are, as such, viewed by this model as necessary to 
the overall healthy functioning of the system. This approach to urban housing markets 
grew out of the seminal work of the Chicago School, which dominated sociology in the 
1920s and 1930s (Kurtz 1984; Park 1925). 
The dominance of this approach to urban housing markets in sociology and 
economics continues, though recent sociological analyses have seriously challenged the 
classical model's underlying assumptions. Scholars such as Manuel Castells have applied 
Marxist conceptions to urban issues (Castells 1983). Other Marxists, such as Bratt, 
Hartman, and Meyerson (1986), have focused explicitly upon the housing market. Neo-
Weberian authors have also attacked the classical model (Gilderbloom and Appelbaum 
1988). These writers agree that profit-motivated actors make investment decisions which 
significantly determine the shape and trajectory of local housing markets. Housing 
problems, they argue, are not the necessary result of a generally beneficent market, but are 
forced upon the lower classes by monied actors seeking profit. As Achtenburg and 
Marcuse (1986, p. 4) write: 
Why is the housing problem so bad, and why is it getting worse? There are many 
contributing factors, but the principal reason is that housing in our society is 
produced, financed, owned, operated, and sold in ways designed to serve the 
interests of private capital. Housing - a necessity oflife - is treated not as a social 
good but as a source of private profit, as a commodity .... 
For these writers, people with power determine what will happen in urban housing 
markets, though they may be required to sacrifice at times in negotiation with grass-roots 
organizing efforts (Castells 1983). Numerous authors have detailed the important role of 
various powerful actors in determining the course of development in neighborhoods 
(Medoff and Sklar 1994; Gilderbloom and Appelbaum 1988; Downs 1981). Lending 
institutions, insurance companies, real estate groups, and professional developers, among 
others, make investment decisions which shape housing markets. I provide more detail 
regarding the importance of these actors when I discuss investment cycles in Chapter 2. 
As Gerald Suttles (1990) writes, the city is "man-made" (and woman-made), rather than 
being shaped by blind, impersonal forces like "the housing market." 
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Much of the sociological work which challenges the classical model also 
emphasizes the importance of government in making decisions which significantly affect 
the housing market. In general, these studies argue that the state tends to make decisions 
which support the interests of capital, but also emphasize that government may become 
the site for challenges to capitalist interests. Massey and Denton ( 1993 ), for example, 
provide historical detail which implicates the federal government and its local counterparts 
in institutionalized efforts to build and maintain the residential segregation of African-
Americans in this country. Nyden and Wiewel (1991) charge the various levels of 
government with decision-making which helps to generate a process of "uneven 
development," in which downtown corporate interests benefit at the expense of working 
class neighborhoods. Both of these authors, though, also discuss the success of grass-
roots efforts to change the housing policies of government. Indeed, as Shearer (1989) 
describes, progressive coalitions gained political control of several city governments in the 
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1980s. Neighborhood-based housing and economic development programs, as a result, 
were implemented in varying degrees in Boston, Cleveland, San Antonio, Seattle, 
Portland, and Chicago. Many of the most important reforms were later retracted, though, 
so that most sympathetic scholars agree that city governments have generally failed to 
overcome the power of corporate interests in defining local development policy. 
In many cases, in fact, city governments have created policy in alliance with 
corporate interests and in opposition to lower income people and their representatives. 
"Downtown" interests, as a result, have generally overshadowed "neighborhood" interests 
in city policy. This occurred partly because, as Derek Shearer (1989, p. 289) writes: 
Most of the mayors, corporate leaders, newspaper editors, and other elites in . . . 
cities suffer from a common syndrome - the "edifice complex," which equates 
progress with the construction of high-rise office towers, sports stadiums, 
convention centers, and cultural megaplaces, but ignores the basic needs of most 
city residents. 
Mayoral affection for large downtown projects is not a new phenomenon. Richard 
J. Daley, the current mayor's infamous father, proposed several major downtown projects 
in the late 1960s and 1970s, some of which failed (Suttles 1990, pp. 12-13). The current 
Mayor Daley's recent economic development proposals have included a lakefront casino 
complex, an expansion of the McCormick Place convention center, gambling riverboats, a 
major third airport, the renovation of Soldier Field, and a trolley line for the northern 
downtown shopping district. Daley and his staff also supported the creation of a Tax 
Increment Financing district in the South Loop, which will pump $104 million into the 
area in the form of infrastructure improvements. As property values in the area increase, 
the additional money that flows into city coffers will be skimmed off to repay bonds 
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enabling the current development. The policy, then, will succeed only ifhigher income 
residents and upscale businesses increasingly dominate the area. The mayor and his 
supporters claim that their proposals will create jobs. But, as David Harvey (1985, p. 
216) writes, "The argument that the only way to preserve jobs for an increasingly 
impoverished under class is to create consumer palaces for the rich with public subsidy has 
at some point to wear thin." 
Grimshaw (1992, pp. 206-24) argues that the old democratic machine in Chicago 
is weakened enough to cause Mayor Daley to maintain at least an image of commitment to 
"neighborhood" policies. The coalition which elected Daley to office includes a liberal 
whites and Hispanics who demand that neighborhood issues be addressed by the city. 
According to Grimshaw, however, Daley's public persona masks a conservative political 
agenda. When Daley first came to office, he chose a multi-cultural staff to head his 
various departments. For the Department of Housing, he chose Michael Schubert, widely 
known in liberal circles for his work with the non-profit Neighborhood Housing Services. 
Grimshaw argues, though, that Daley maintained control over the departments, assuring 
that his liberal commissioners either did his bidding or were pushed out of power (pp. 214-
15). Schubert, in fact, left the Department of Housing and was replaced by Marina 
Carrott, whose background lies in commercial banking, soon after Grimshaw' s book was 
written. Ms. Carrott served as commissioner of the department during 1994 and 1995, 
when the spending analyzed in this thesis occurred. 
In this thesis, I argue that the City of Chicago Department of Housing is producing 
affordable housing in a manner which fails to benefit those Chicagoans most in need of 
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assistance as well as it might. In so arguing, I accept an underlying assumption that the 
housing policies of local governments may have a significant impact on housing markets. 
This argument is supported by recent studies of federally funded social programs. 
Rich (1993), for example, examined how the City of Chicago spent its federal Community 
Development Block Grant (CDBG) funds from 1975 to 1990. He concluded that: 
It was the distinctive and very different mayoral administrations that set the 
context within which the city's CDBG program was implemented; legislative and 
administrative changes at the federal level had very little impact, if any, on the 
content and scope of the city's community development program (Rich 1993, p. 
215) 
Rich provides numerous and fascinating details regarding the manner in which 
CDBG dollars were spent by the various city administrations. The type and location of 
the social services produced was determined not by federal guidelines but by local political 
and fiscal climates. Indeed, according to Rich, Jane Byrne's administration actively 
resisted HUD attempts to force the city to meet federal targeting objectives, channelling 
the money instead to the mayor's pet projects (p. 218). Mayor Harold Washington sought 
to distribute CDBG money in a manner commensurate with HUD goals, but his job was 
made difficult by a newly powerful City Council which encouraged political compromise 
and by a Reagan administration unconcerned with rallying behind the mayor (p. 218). 
Williams (1980) studied the CDBG program in the first few years of its existence. 
He argues that federal guidelines for social programs in general were extremely strict in 
the 1960s, since local and state governments were often viewed as part of the problem (p. 
1 ). Under the Nixon adminstration, though, federal oversight was weakened and 
increased flexibility was provided to local governments. The CDBG program was a 
flagship of the "New Federalist" approach to social welfare spending. Williams found 
that, as a result of the CDBG program, local government agencies had "gained a notable 
amount of power in the area of housing and community development. .. " (p. 112). The 
CDBG program remains a mainstay of federal funding for housing (see Chapter 3). 
Indeed, the current Republican Congress plans to delegate even more federal power over 
social service programs to state and city governments. 
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My findings show that the current Daley administration, as represented at DOH, is 
clearly making programmatic choices that are affecting who gets housing assistance and 
what sort of housing they get. In implementing its housing programs, the department is 
also helping to shape the development trajectories of various city neighborhoods. DOH 
has the power to create certain types of housing for certain types of people in Chicago. 
When this power is coordinated with the programs of other city departments, such as the 
Department of Planning and Development and the Department of Buildings, the effect on 
low-income neighborhoods can be very significant. In contrast to the classic ecological 
approach, this thesis presents evidence which implies that the decisions of powerful 
individuals - not blind economic forces - determine the shape of housing markets. 
Chapter 2 provides an overview of the housing needs of Chicago's citizens. I have 
included this chapter to ensure that my discussion of housing policy is based on an 
understanding of the real-life problems that local housing policy should be designed to 
address. 
Policy may be designed to address the current needs of citizens, but it must be 
implemented in a political process with a history and a current focus. The history and 
current status of federal housing programs is vital to understanding the City of Chicago's 
housing policy. Indeed, in 1995, 80 percent of all subsidy money available to DOH came 
from the federal government. In Chapter 3, I discuss the history of federal housing 
programs, setting DOH' s various funding programs in context. 
In Chapter 4, I overview the City of Chicago Department of Housing itself, 
including details about the department's overall expenditures in 1994 and 1995. In this 
chapter, I also describe and analyze the department's major programs. 
Chapter 5 presents my analysis of the department's 1994 and 1995 public, 
quarterly reports to City Council. In total, the analysis shows that DOH is failing to 
allocate its resources in a way that would maximize, using existing funds, the creation of 
housing affordable to the people most in need in the city. 
In Chapter 6, I present my conclusions in summary form. 
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CHAPTER2 
HOUSING PROBLEMS IN CHICAGO 
My analysis of City of Chicago Department of Housing (DOH) programs rightly 
begins with a careful look at the housing needs of the city's citizens. By pulling together 
data others have developed, I intend in this chapter to draw a picture of the housing 
problems that Chicagoans face living in the city today. Equipped with this picture, I'll be 
better able to analyze the DOH policy which emerges from the department's quarterly 
reports. 
I intend to focus upon the housing problems faced by low-income Chicagoans. 
This focus does not deny that in some ways, people at higher income levels have "housing 
problems," such as those associated with rising costs. Property tax increases, the rising 
costs of real estate insurance, and the costs of maintenance all are legitimate concerns of 
higher income Chicagoans. I focus, though, upon lower income people because the most 
burdensome problems fall squarely upon their shoulders. Indeed, to some extent, the 
rising costs faced by higher income people in the city are passed on to lower income 
individuals. Landlords whose costs increase tend to raise the rents to compensate. 
Indeed, rental costs in Chicago have soared recently, partly due to the higher tax and cost 
burdens faced by landlords. 
IO 
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Also, middle-income people benefitted in recent years from a relatively stable 
market for single family homes in Chicago. This trend, contrary to the much more volatile 
market pattern in urban areas on the country's coasts during the 1980s, meant that home 
prices remained attractively low for middle-income Chicagoans. The median home value 
in Chicago in 1990 was $78,700, slightly less than the national median of$79,100 (Holeb 
1993, p. 51). 
In recent years, young professional middle-class people, most of whom are white, 
have led a wave of investment in neighborhoods near the central business district of 
several major cities (Hutchison 1992; Squires 1989; Palen and London 1984). These 
young individuals and families are often drawn to high-paying jobs in downtown service 
and knowledge industries. They also tend to be attracted to the inner-city by low housing 
prices, short commutes to work, an aesthetic taste that values older architecture, and 
massive downtown development projects. 
Middle-class interest in urban neighborhoods is important to cities like Chicago, 
whose tax base and political strength have been eroded as many relatively affluent people 
have moved to the economically vibrant suburbs. Holding and attracting middle-income 
people to the city, as a result, is often viewed as a key aspect of any urban planning 
agenda (T. Wright 1995). This agenda has significantly affected the housing policy of 
many U.S. city governments, and Chicago is no exception. 
I concur that holding and attracting middle-income people to Chicago is a valid 
and important enterprise. But, unlike some policy makers, I cannot accept this agenda as 
the centerpiece of effective housing development efforts. Policy rightly begins with the 
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most pressing needs oflocal citizenry. Middle-income housing needs pale in comparison 
with the alarming needs oflower income people in the city. As this chapter will detail, 
low-income people face significant - and very basic - housing problems that require 
immediate attention. Effective housing policy would place these problems at the center of 
its agenda, so that the city would pursue its interest in holding and attracting middle-
income people through a policy that first assured that low-income people's urgent housing 
needs were addressed. 
The Regional Economy 
Any discussion of housing problems in Chicago must properly occur within the 
context of the broad economic and social trends which have affected the city in recent 
years. Housing problems often find their roots in these broader trends. In Chicago, for 
example, changes in the regional and national economy have helped to concentrate low-
income people in isolated ghetto neighborhoods far away from good-paying jobs. The 
consequences for the city's housing problems have been severe. In this section, then, I 
will provide a brief overview of these economic changes and their effects on city 
neighborhoods. 
For decades, Chicagoans relied heavily upon the city's manufacturing companies 
to provide jobs at relatively high wages. In recent years, however, these jobs have 
increasingly left the city for either the suburbs, other parts of the country, or overseas 
locations. The City of Chicago lost 411,000 factory jobs between 1947 and 1982, a 
decline of 59 percent, while factory jobs in the suburbs increased by 131 percent over the 
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same period (Squires, Bennett, Mccourt and Nyden 1987, p. 27). While increases in 
suburban manufacturing did occur, many companies left the region entirely or diversified 
into the growing service sector. The metropolitan region as a whole experienced a net 
loss of 150,000 manufacturing jobs from 1979 to 1988, but a net increase of200,000 jobs 
in retail, finance, insurance, and real estate (Wiewel 1990, p. 28). 
Working and lower-class communities in Chicago and the older suburbs have been 
disproportionately affected by these changes. Between 1963 and 1977, for example, the 
available factory jobs in predominantly African-American neighborhoods on the West and 
South Sides of Chicago declined by over 45 percent (Squires, Bennett, McCourt and 
Nyden 1987, p. 30). Such losses in factory jobs, moreover, caused serious ripple effects in 
the rest of the local economies of these neighborhoods. Businesses which provided 
supplies to the larger companies, and those that relied on steady workers' wages, were 
severely hurt by the loss in factory jobs. 
As the region's economy crumbled in many inner-city neighborhoods and boomed 
in many suburban areas, population shifts followed suit. The city's white population 
dropped nearly 20 percent in the 1980s, while the black population dropped nearly 10 
percent. Hispanic and Asian immigrants streamed into the city, offsetting losses in the 
older populations. The Hispanic population alone increased 29 percent. 
At the same time, the population of the suburbs has increased dramatically. The 
region's political balance has been altered as a result, with suburban whites often 
dominating state politics from government seats that are not accountable to the city's 
poorer minority residents. 
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Certain portions of the city, though, were less affected by the economic changes 
than others. The central business district witnessed modest job growth, due largely to new 
office construction (Ludgin 1986). By far, though, the majority of the region's job growth 
over the last two decades has occurred in the newer suburbs, especially those west and 
northwest of the city. Lower income Chicagoans, once able to find good-paying jobs near 
their homes, now find themselves isolated far from the available positions. The jobs that 
are increasingly available for low-skill individuals, moreover, tend to pay poorly and offer 
minimal, if any, benefits (Wintermute and Hicklin 1991, p. 157). 
The Underclass 
Many urban minority neighborhoods have been seriously affected as relatively high 
paying jobs and middle-class residents have left the city (Wilson 1987). Low-income 
people remain, increasingly concentrated in neighborhoods rife with violence and heavy 
drug use. The poverty rate in Chicago's South Side neighborhood of Oakland, for 
example, climbed from 42.7 percent in 1969 to 65.6 percent in 1979 and finally to 72.3 
percent in 1989 (Holeb 1993, p. 81). In fourteen of Chicago's minority neighborhoods, 
the median household income in 1990 was less than $15,000 (Chicago Rehab Network 
1993, p. 9). Very low-income families find themselves increasingly concentrated in 
neighborhoods which offer few respectable job opportunities and surrounded by the social 
pathologies that are associated with poverty. 
Poverty is also concentrated as a result of racial segregation perpetuated in part by 
institutional practices which restrict opportunities for African-Americans and, to a lesser 
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extent, other minorities. According to Massey and Denton (1993, p. 64), the average 
African-American in Chicago in 1980 lived in a community that was 82.8 percent black. 
This concentration, they argue, is not the result of personal choice, but of racial prejudice 
expressed mainly in lending, real estate, and zoning policies which intentionally restrict 
blacks from moving to areas protected by whites. When economic downturns occur, 
Massey and Denton contend, poverty increases most drastically in the neighborhoods 
where it is most highly concentrated - predominantly African-American urban areas 
hemmed in by racial prejudice. This may help explain why 47 percent of all black children 
in Chicago live in poverty (Holeb 1993, p. 79). 
Housing Problems in Low-income Neighborhoods 
High Costs 
Whatever the causes, many low-income minority people in Chicago face severe 
housing problems. Most basic among these problems is cost. Housing in Chicago 
generally costs more than most very low-income residents can afford without excessive 
burdens on other basic needs, such as food and child care supplies. Rental costs, 
moreover, soared over the course of the 1980s. The median contract rent in Chicago 
doubled from 1980 to 1990, from $188 to $377, an increase which far outpaced increases 
in the Consumer Price Index over the decade (Holeb 1993, p. 54). 
As costs rose, the meager incomes of very low-income people were severely 
strained. The federal government bases many of its housing assistance programs on the 
premise that people should not pay more than 30 percent of their income on rent. In 
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1990, 35 percent of Chicago renters paid more than 35 percent of their monthly income on 
rent; in six lower income communities, more than half of all tenants paid over 3 5 percent 
(P. Wright 1993, p. 14). 
Demolition 
Lower quality, low-cost units in Chicago, moreover, are being demolished in 
extraordinary numbers. The city lost 10 percent of its housing units from 1970 to 1980 
and another 10 percent from 1980 to 1990 (Holeb 1993, p. 65). According to the 
Lakefront SRO corporation, more than 70 percent of the city's single-room occupancy 
apartment buildings were either demolished or converted to other uses from the early 
1970s to the early 1990s (Lakefront SRO 1993). Losses in housing were concentrated in 
lower income African-American neighborhoods and suburbs. Indeed, some inner-city 
white neighborhoods, including Lincoln Park and the Near North Side, experienced net 
increases in housing units during the 1980s. In sixteen Chicago communities, mainly low-
income African-American neighborhoods, however, at least a quarter of the property now 
lies vacant (Chicago Rehab Network 1993, p. 13). 
Nevertheless, demolition rates in the city appear to be increasing during the 1990s. 
11.2 percent of the city's total housing stock was vacant in 1990, awaiting the wrecking 
ball (Chicago Rehab Network 1993, p. 69). Indeed, the number of demolitions conducted 
by the City of Chicago has grown drastically over the course of the nineties. In 1989, 
according to the spring 1995 newsletter of the Chicago Alliance for Neighborhood Safety 
(CANS), the city demolished 231 buildings, spending a total of $1.8 million to do so. In 
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1994, by comparison, the city knocked down 1153 buildings at a cost of $10 million. The 
1995 budget, according to CANS, was $15 million, a 33 percent increase over last year 
alone. 
Deterioration 
Many of the lower-cost units which are not vacant in the city, especially in poorer 
minority neighborhoods, are seriously deteriorated. In 1993, in the South Side 
neighborhood of New City alone, 855 buildings had cases pending in the city's Housing 
Court for violations of the local building code (Chicago Rehab Network 1993, p. 67). In 
contrast, only four cases were pending in the relatively affluent Edison Park neighborhood. 
In part, the city housing stock is deteriorating because it is old. The mean age of all 
occupied housing structures in Chicago in 1990 was 66 years (Holeb 1993, p. 64). 
However, the failure of local lending institutions to provide credit for building renovations 
and purchases in low-income neighborhoods is also to blame. (Woodstock Institute 
1994). 
The Negative Development Cycle - Disinvestment and Gentrification 
Low-income Chicagoans are also negatively affected by the way that real estate 
development tends to proceed in urban areas. This process tends to be cyclical, moving 
from periods of"disinvestment" through periods of heavy investment known as 
"gentrification," and back again to "disinvestment" (Snow 1995; Achtenburg and Marcuse 
1986; Downs 1981 ). Lower income people do not benefit from either disinvestment or 
gentrification. During periods of disinvestment (Medoff and Sklar 1994), real estate 
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developers refuse to invest and withdraw resources from their existing investments in the 
neighborhood. Often, these investors are busy seeking profits in new, growing markets 
(Achtenburg and Marcuse 1986). Meanwhile, a self-fulfilling prophecy takes hold in the 
once stable area as banks refuse credit and people of means begin to flee rising crime rates 
and lower rates of appreciation. Insurance companies pull out and city services dwindle. 
Institutions begin to crumble from a lack of resources and from the instability of the 
population. Arsons skyrocket. Buildings crumble from neglect and are eventually 
demolished. The local infrastructure of sewers, viaducts, streets and sidewalks begins to 
sag and crack. Often, this process is associated with racial "tipping," as African-
Americans move in and eventually re-segregate the area, the agents of disinvestment begin 
their withdrawal. 
Disinvestment in various Chicago neighborhoods has been well-documented in 
several studies, mostly by local community-based organizations, focusing upon various 
aspects of the process. The Woodstock Institute ( 1994) has gathered important data 
which shows that lending institutions distribute credit in highly inequitable ways. Indeed, 
according to the Chicago Rehab Network (1993, p. 35), lending institutions invested 
$240.9 million in affluent Lincoln Park and only $2.9 million in the heavily low-income 
neighborhood of East Garfield Park. The Neighborhood Capital Budget Group (NCBG) 
concluded that nearly 50 percent of all recent city spending on infrastructure supported 
either "mega-projects" like the Central Area Circulator and the Harold Washington 
Library, or downtown improvement projects - at the expense of city neighborhoods 
(Neighborhood Capital Budget Group 1995). Illinois Public Action found that the 
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nation's two largest automobile and homeowner' s insurance providers, Allstate and State 
Farm, disproportionately concentrated their agents and policies in white areas of Chicago 
(Illinois Public Action 1993). 
Eventually, disinvestment so overwhelms a neighborhood that it "bottoms out" as 
a slum. Large amounts of vacant land and property provide the neighborhood with a 
ghost town feel. Only low-income people remain, because they can't afford to live in 
other areas, because they choose to be close to friends and family, or because they are 
involved with the local underground economy. These people are surrounded by crime, 
drug abuse, and a deteriorated physical environment, with few housing choices that would 
be acceptable the majority of the city's population. 
At this point, the area may become interesting again to investors, who are lured by 
low purchase prices and dreams of high profits (Snow 1995, p. 8). Gradually, initial 
investments encourage other developers and a pattern of increasing investment takes 
hold. Banks begin offering credit again, most importantly to the developers swooping 
down on the neighborhood from the outside. A self-fulfilling prophecy of confidence 
within the market generates increasing investment and dreams of hefty profits become a 
reality. The neighborhood "gentrifies." People of lower incomes, many of whom survived 
the period of disinvestment, are forced to move as rents and taxes rise above their ability 
to pay. Often, gentrification is associated with racial change, as a heavily minority 
neighborhood resegregates with whites. 
Marxist scholars Marcuse and Achtenburg (1986, p. 6) conceive of cycles in the 
American real estate market as not limited to the particular development patterns of 
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individual neighborhoods. After World War II, they argue, central cities had exhausted 
their capacity to generate increasing profits for real estate developers and lenders, who 
found opportunities more attractive in the suburbs. Once inner-city markets had 
deteriorated to a point where purchasing property there became cheap and consumers 
were again attracted to these locations, speculators purchased the properties. Capitalism 
encourages this sort of cyclical pattern of deterioration and investment, Achtenburg and 
Marcuse contend, because profit-seeking compels investors to continually seek the highest 
possible returns. 
CHAPTER3 
A IDSTORY OF HOUSING POLICY IN AMERICA 
City of Chicago housing policy is largely shaped by policy decisions made at the 
federal level and implemented by the United States Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD). In 1995, about 80 percent of the city Department of Housing's 
budget for housing creation came directly from the federal government. While the city has 
significant power to distribute federal funding in accordance with its perception of local 
needs, federal allocations and policy limit and direct city programs in extremely important 
ways. HUD guidelines regulate the sorts of projects that may be funded using federal 
dollars. When the HUD budget is cut, moreover, local government housing programs are 
significantly affected. A history of federal housing policy, as a result, provides vital 
context for understanding how city programs operate today. 
Federal housing policy in America began in the midst of the Great Depression. 
The dilapidation of inner city neighborhoods concerned reformers from the late nineteenth 
century, but their impact was limited by the reach and resources available to the federal 
government at the time. Indeed, in 1902, Theodore Roosevelt suggested that his 
administration finance the purchase of slum housing, but his suggestion was so 
incongruous with the federal mandate at the time that his proposal was never implemented 
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(Sternlieb and Listokin 1986, p. 30). Faced with the economic collapse of the Great 
Depression, though, private economic interests were desperate enough to allow and even 
demand federal intervention. 
Real estate investment crumbled with the rest of the nation's economy as the 
Depression took hold. Housing starts, for example, fell from 937,000 in 1925 to 100,000 
in 1933 (Mitchell 1985, p. 42). Foreclosures and bank failures, in addition, combined to 
shatter the country's home financing structures. At one point, in 1931, nearly 1000 home 
mortgages were being foreclosed every day (Sternlieb and Listokin 1986, p. 32). Millions 
of people, moreover, were out of work due, clearly, to no fault of their own. In the early 
1930's, in response, the federal government aggressively intervened. Emergency financing 
programs, loan programs, and efforts to stabilize the mortgage market were implemented. 
Public housing was also first funded during this period (Meehan 1985). In 1934, President 
Roosevelt created the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), which provided 
government insurance of home mortgages. This program successfully encouraged private 
housing construction at a time when few homes were being built and changed the typical 
loan structure for home purchases from short-term balloon payments to long-term, 
amortized payment schedules (Hays 1995, p. 85). 
As a result, the number of people who could afford a home in America drastically 
increased. The group which Friedman (1968) refers to as "the submerged middle class" 
benefitted enormously from FHA programs. The ability to purchase homes expanded the 
range of possible neighborhoods in which these families could live. These people also 
benefitted from tax breaks written into law since the inception of income tax in America in 
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1913. Mortgage interest and local property taxes can be directly deducted from taxable 
income, a benefit that is especially important to those with higher incomes (Hays 1995, p. 
87). 
Most minority families at the time were, of course, not able to access FHA-insured 
loans because their income did not meet even the lowered threshold created by the change 
in loan structures. Moreover, the FHA baldly discriminated against those minorities who 
might have qualified. Following the lead oflong-established industry guidelines, the FHA 
systematically refused mortgages to most minority areas through a process known as 
"redlining." The FHA determined whether or not to provide a loan based on a rating 
process which rejected older, inner city neighborhoods containing minorities as 
undesirable. African-American areas received the lowest rating, which was coded red. 
New, homogenous, white neighborhoods received the highest marks, a set of criteria 
which helped to create America's suburbs. Discrimination embedded in federal loan 
criteria was congruent with the FHA' s support for racially restrictive covenants. 
Homeowner coalitions and suburban governments refused admittance to minorities by 
establishing covenants which legally restricted them. Until 1950, two years after 
covenants were deemed indefensible by the U.S. Supreme Court, the FHA officially 
supported their use (Massey and Denton 1993, p. 54). 
After World War II, returning veterans and fear of a return to pre-war economic 
conditions precipitated continued federal housing support. Government subsidies funneled 
through the Veteran's Administration provided low-interest loans to war veterans, who 
became homeowners in droves. The suburbs blossomed as optimistic young families, 
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armed with VA and FHA-insured loans, settled away from inner cities along 
superhighways also constructed with government funds. Housing prices soared with the 
burgeoning demand for new homes. Indeed, the median value of all dwelling units in 1950 
was two and a halftimes the 1940 value (Mitchell 1985, p. 9). In the midst of this 
booming real estate market, the Housing Act of 1949 called for "a decent home and a 
suitable living environment for every American family." 
While federal policy supported massive housing creation in the suburbs, it tended 
to destroy housing in central cities. Slum clearance became increasingly central to 
government housing efforts in the older urban areas. The basic economic machine of 
central cities was believed to be well functioning; cities were merely in need of a cosmetic 
clean-up that would tidy up the low-income, usually minority neighborhoods. The 
Housing Act of 1949, the one that called for decent homes for every American, thus 
authorized one billion dollars in loans and one-half billion dollars in grants to help cities to 
demolish the housing in poor areas (Stemlieb and Listokin 1986, p. 42). Later called 
Urban Renewal, the program succeeded in facilitating a clean up of sorts. As of 1967, 
Urban Renewal had demolished about 400,000 housing units. Unfortunately, the program 
only created 10, 760 new units for those displaced (Weiss 1985, p. 254). Public housing 
was often built where the old neighborhoods once stood. In the late 1940s, Congress 
authorized the creation of 800,000 public housing units, although this number was not 
actually reached until the 1970s (Orlebeke 1993, p. 106). Politicians and neighborhood 
activists fought vigorously over the placement of public housing units, a struggle that 
helped to assure that low-income African-Americans would be isolated in concentrated 
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pockets of poverty in years to come. 
In the 1940s and 1950s, middle and moderate-income whites mostly benefitted 
from government programs. In the 1960s, federal programs began to focus more 
aggressively on the housing needs of low-income minority people. The Civil Rights 
Movement, a wave of optimism in government, urban riots, and a number of influential 
books helped to generate the activism that underlay much federal housing policy of the 
1960's. The activism took myriad directions. Policy makers during the decade, for 
example, increasingly recognized the power of racial prejudice in constricting the choices 
of African American home buyers and shaping the segregated contours of the nation's real 
estate markets. The Civil Rights Act of 1968, developed in response to this recognition, 
explicitly prohibited racial discrimination in the housing market (Massey and Denton 1993, 
p. 59). New subsidy programs were also created which provided low-interest loans to 
rental housing developers. These programs targeted those households who earned 
incomes just above those of public housing tenants. In part to administer the new 
programs, President Lyndon Johnson created the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD) in 1965. 
Data on the nation's housing stock in the 1960s worried many experts. The 
upcoming decade promised a drastically increased housing demand as the Baby Boomer 
generation married and had kids. Moreover, the 1960 census revealed that one out of six 
housing units in the country where either deteriorated or heading in that direction 
(Orlebeke 1993, p. 107). The President's Committee on Urban Housing, moreover, 
estimated that 7.8 million households were paying more than 25 percent of their income 
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for housing (Orlebeke 1993, p. 107). Burdensome costs, the committee worried, 
destabilized families and limited their choices of neighborhoods to areas with high levels of 
social pathology. 
In response to these alarming numbers, Congress adopted the Housing Act of 
1968. The act set a goal calling for the creation of six million new subsidized housing 
units in ten years. It also created two new subsidy programs. Section 235 provided low-
interest, FHA-insured loans to low-income home purchasers. The loans could be 
amortized over a period of forty years. Section 236 provided the same sort ofloans to 
multi-family apartment developers (Sternleib and Listokin 1986, p. 45). These new 
programs generated an enormous amount of subsidized housing production in subsequent 
years. Indeed, from 1970 to 1973, the nation produced 1,676,000 units of subsidized 
housing, more than had been created in total since federal housing assistance had begun 
(Orlebeke 1993, p. 108). At HUD's inception, subsidized housing represented only a 
very small portion of the nation's annual housing production; only in 1966 did subsidized 
housing starts equal over five percent of all starts in the country. By 1970, thanks to 
drastically increased federal funding for housing, the figure had jumped to nearly 30 
percent (Orlebeke 1993, p. 108). The housing industry in general was booming as well. 
Total housing starts in the country exceeded two million each year from 1971 to 1973 
(Mitchell 1985, p. 12). 
Cost concerns and frustration over the state of the country's public housing stock, 
however, eventually caused President Nixon to call for a reevaluation of his 
administration's housing policy. HUD, after a review of its current programs in 1973, 
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implemented a moratorium on new spending until the role of federal housing support 
could be further evaluated and reformed (Mitchell 1985, p. 13). Public housing was 
roundly criticized during the subsequent policy debate for its high costs, dilapidation, and 
failure to save large numbers of families from long-term poverty. The high rises that were 
public housing's most visible contribution to the urban landscape, moreover, clearly 
contributed to the segregation of African Americans. Finally, as the political power 
balance shifted away from central cities to the suburbs, support for HUD programs 
decreased. Nixon's moratorium congealed these various concerns. Before it was over, 
the federal government had stepped away from programs which sought to strengthen the 
supply of affordable urban housing. A switch to demand-side programs began. Section 8 
was born. 
At its inception in 197 4, Section 8 provided direct rental assistance in basically two 
different ways. In some cases, the federal government guaranteed to a developer of low-
income housing that it would provide annual rental subsidies that would make up the 
difference between the rents the developer could get on the open market and the rents that 
low-income tenants could afford to pay. In other cases, HUD provided certificates to 
low-income tenants which guaranteed federal assistance to any landlord who rented an 
apartment to the certificate holder. Using the certificates, tenants could theoretically shop 
the open market, thus breaking the barriers of economic and racial segregation. Section 8 
tenants paid 25 to 30 percent of their income for rent (the number changed over time) and 
HUD made up the difference. Until Ronald Reagan came to office, most federal support 
was provided to developers of new, low-income units, rather than directly to tenants 
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(Sternlieb and Listokin 1986, p. 48). Since Reagan took office, by contrast, almost all 
Section 8 funds have been distributed directly to tenants in the form of certificates. While 
the Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act of 1987 created some Section 8 
financing which is distributed directly to developers of SRO housing, most "project-based" 
Section 8 programs remain obsolete. 
The Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program was also created by 
Congress in 197 4. This program sought to increase the capacity of cities to use federal 
funds in a flexible manner to address problems particular to their area. Spending on 
housing was not required by the grant guidelines, but cities tended to spend many of the 
CDBG dollars for this purpose (Orlebeke 1993, p. 109). 
President Reagan severely cut federal assistance for housing during his tenure. 
HUD's total budget authority decreased 57 percent from 1980 to 1987, falling from seven 
percent of the federal budget in 1978 to about one percent in 1987 (Schwartz, Ferlauto, 
and Hoffman 1988, p. 4 7). Supply-side programs supporting the creation of affordable 
housing were virtually wiped out. Rental assistance became the flagship of the Reagan 
housing policy agenda. The President's Commission on Housing in 1982 stated, "The 
primary national need is not for massive production of new apartments for the poor, but 
for income supplements that will enable low-income families to live in available decent 
housing at a cost they can afford" (President's Commission on Housing 1982, xxii, as 
quoted in Orlebeke 1993, p. 110). 
As part of its tax reform effort in 1986, however, Congress created a new program 
called the Low Income Housing Tax Credit. The tax credit program promised high 
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returns to investors if they supported the creation of housing affordable to lower income 
people. The federal government distributes its total tax credit budget to the states on the 
basis of total population. The states can then use the credits to attract money from 
corporate investors. Housing benefitting from tax credits must remain affordable to low-
income renters for at least 15 years (for more information, see Low Income Housing Tax 
Credits, in Chapter 3). 
The subsidies provided through the tax credit are rarely enough to provide rents 
affordable to low-income people. As a result, developers seeking to provide low rents 
must seek other subsidy money to supplement their loan package. During the 1980s, 
when tax credits became practically the only means of federal support for affordable 
housing creation, developers realized they needed new local funding sources. As a result, 
states and cities began spending their own money, usually for the first time ever, to 
support housing (Lenz and Shaw 1993, p. 131 ). A flood of new programs sprang up at 
the local level. In Illinois, for example, a number of programs employed intricacies of the 
local tax codes to support affordable housing development. Tax delinquent properties 
became eligible for purchase by low-income housing developers, thanks to an effort led by 
the Chicago Rehab Network, a coalition oflocal non-profit housing development 
organizations. The Cook County Assessor's office began a program which offered to 
halve the property taxes due on newly rehabbed, low-income housing for eight years. The 
City of Chicago implemented a program designed to encourage new home construction on 
city-owned vacant lots. The State of Illinois used real estate tax funds to fund a_ low-
income housing assistance program. Compared to other states and municipalities, Illinois 
and the City of Chicago were slow to implement these programs, and local funding for 
housing is still relatively low. But at least the programs helped to offset the drastic 
reductions in federal housing spending that occurred during the 1980s. 
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Private lending institutions also implemented programs during the 1980's that 
helped to fill the gap left by federal withdrawal. The Community Reinvestment Act, 
passed in 1977 in response to a grass-roots effort of community organizations around the 
country, forced lenders to provide credit to low-income neighborhoods within their 
service area. Federal regulators review every bank's lending patterns to assure that they 
meet the requirements of the law. If a bank receives an unsatisfactory grade, any pending 
application to open a new branch or purchase another bank may be disapproved. The 
legislation has allowed community organizations across the country to negotiate 
substantial commitments from banks to provide credit for low-income neighborhoods. 
In Chicago, a coalition of three dozen community groups called the Chicago 
Reinvestment Alliance negotiated the creation of the Neighborhood Lending Program, 
which provides low-interest loans through three of the city's major banks for local housing 
and economic development projects. First National Bank, Northern Trust, and Harris 
Bank pledged nearly $200 million through the program. LaSalle National Bank, another 
major lender, later created a similar neighborhood lending program. 
As federal programs for housing creation dwindled, non-profit housing 
development organizations paradoxically emerged as a powerful force in local subsidized 
housing markets (Vidal 1992, p. 6). Many of these organizations locate their roots in 
activist community organization efforts of the 1960s and 1970s. They seek ownership of 
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land and property in poor and working-class neighborhoods, hoping that through their 
organization the local community will have control over its own resources instead of being 
subject to the profit-making decisions of outside investors. Most of these development 
organizations are overseen by boards of community residents. During the 1970s, when 
many of Chicago's CDCs were born, federal funding directly supported their efforts. The 
severe budget cuts of the 1980s forced these groups to develop innovative relationships 
with banks and local government. Non-profit loan packages since this time have often 
drawn on five or six financing sources, creating enormous administrative difficulty for 
these organizations. Still, the number of housing units created by non-profit CDCs in 
Chicago increased drastically during the 1980s and early 1990s (Lenz 1993, p. 21). 
Compared to the need in many low-income areas, though, the impact of CDCs was 
relatively minor. The number of units under development by CDCs on the west side in 
1992 equaled less than one percent of the units lost in those neighborhoods during the 
1980s (Nathalie P. Voorhees Center for Neighborhood and Community Improvement 
1992, p. 23). 
Nevertheless, Chicago currently boasts one of the strongest infrastructures of 
housing CDCs in the country. The Chicago Rehab Network (CRN), a coalition mostly 
consisting of CDCs, supports 3 7 member organizations. CRN provides technical 
assistance, financing help through a loan pool, and a training program for non-profit 
developers and managers. 
The Local Initiatives Support Corporation (LISC) also provides valuable support 
for local CDCs. LISC administers the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation's 
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Fund for Community Development, which provides operating funds for CDCs. LISC also 
helps CDCs with money supplied by the Ford Foundation, corporations, and banks. 
The Property Management Resource Center (PMRC) offers management training 
for CDCs and other developers of affordable housing. Since management is often difficult 
for understaffed and sometimes inexperienced CDCs, the PMRC programs have become 
an important resource. A national survey of CDCs highlighted PMRC for providing 
CDCs with training and support not available in other cities (Bratt, Keyes, Schwartz, and 
Vidal 1994, p. 45). 
Some for-profit developers have located a profitable niche in affordable housing 
production. These companies access government and bank subsidies through the same 
process used by non-profit groups. Some for-profit developers have created non-profit 
subsidiaries or have partnered with non-profits to produce affordable housing. These 
groups often compete for limited resources with the community-based non-profits 
discussed above. 
The National Affordable Housing Act (NAHA) of 1990 created a number of new 
programs for the creation of low-income housing and thus improved the climate for both 
non-profit and for-profit development organizations. The act's centerpiece is the HOME 
Investment Partnerships program. This program provides flexible funds to states and 
cities for housing efforts. The money does contain some spending restrictions. For 
example, 15 percent of the money must be allocated to non-profit Community Housing 
Development Organizations. These groups must be officially approved by HUD before 
HOME money may come their way. 
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NAHA also created a number of programs designed to encourage home 
ownership. The HOPE I program helps public housing tenants purchase their projects. 
HOPE II assists tenants of private housing to purchase their buildings, and HOPE III helps 
low-income people to buy government-owned, single-family homes (Orlebeke 1993, p. 
122). 
NAHA also created a number of innovative programs to provide housing for 
people with special needs such as those with AIDS, the disabled, the homeless, and the 
elderly. Finally, the act continued funding for rental assistance programs like Section 8. 
Funding for these programs has been uncertain since the Republican Party assumed 
control of Congress in November 1994. Some early rumors even threatened the total 
dissolution of HUD. Federal funding for local housing efforts, at any rate, is likely to 
decrease in coming years if Congress is able to press ahead, as expected, with its 
legislative agenda. 
CHAPTER4 
THE CITY OF CHICAGO DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING 
States and municipalities first began to operate affordable housing programs in the 
1960s, as federal funds became available to local efforts (Lenz and Shaw 1993, p. 131). 
When federal assistance dwindled in the 1980s, cities and states began to spend their own 
funds on affordable housing production for the first time. The State of Illinois and the 
City of Chicago were especially slow to commit their own funds. Not until the late 1980s 
were both spending their own, non-federal funds on this issue (Lenz and Shaw 1993, p. 
131). 
The City of Chicago Department of Housing was created in the early 1980s. By 
1994, when I began my data collection, the department was involved in a wide variety of 
efforts, mostly aimed at providing funds for affordable housing production. In its 
quarterly reports, DOH split its programs into two categories: (1) "Housing creation" 
programs, and (2) "Housing preservation" programs. Housing creation programs refer 
generally to those programs which provide money directly to individuals and organizations 
who provide affordable housing. DOH takes credit for "creating" units of housing in the 
city whenever it provides funding for those housing units through any of the programs in 
this category. Housing preservation programs refer to those which help to preserve 
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affordable housing already existing in Chicago. For example, one "preservation" program 
provides funds for minor repairs to the homes of senior citizens and handicapped 
individuals. In total, the Department of Housing was allocated $101,899,750 in 1994 and 
$140,3 81, 707 in 1995 to distribute through their "housing creation" programs, according 
to the DOH quarterly reports I analyzed. "Housing preservation programs received 
$17,371,510 in 1994 and $13,274,400 in 1995. The data discussed in this thesis is derived 
solely from those programs defined by DOH as "creation" programs. About 75 percent of 
the 1994 money for "housing creation" programs came from federal outlays. In 1995, 
about 80 percent of the allocation came from federal sources. 
In 1994, DOH categorized ten of its programs as "housing creation" programs. In 
1995, thirteen programs were considered under this category. More funds were available 
in the latter year and the department created new programs, in part to spend the additional 
dollars. In both years, three programs dominated the housing creation efforts of the 
department. These three programs, the Low Income Housing Trust Fund, the Low 
Income Housing Tax Credit, and the Multifamily Rehab and New Construction program, 
were responsible for creating the bulk of the units funded by DOH Indeed, these three 
programs accounted for 99. 9 percent of all the units created by DOH in 1994 which were 
affordable to people earning under $15,000 annually and 93 percent of all money spent in 
that year for housing creation. In addition, the department provided more detailed data 
regarding these three programs in their quarterly reports than on any of the other 
programs. Most of the data analyzed for this thesis, as a result, focuses on these three 
programs. The nature of these programs is described in detail below. 
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Low Income Housing Trust Fund (LIHTC) 
This program was created in 1989 as a result of negotiations with the developers 
of a middle-income housing development project on the western edge of the Loop called 
Presidential Towers. The city issued tax-exempt bonds which helped fund the creation of 
Presidential Towers. In exchange, its developers agreed to finance the creation of a fund 
to benefit low-income renters in Chicago. The Low Income Housing Trust Fund resulted, 
though today it is funded primarily with the city's own corporate dollars. 
The Trust Fund provides direct rental subsidies to developers who offer 
low-income housing in the city. The fund is managed by a 15-member board appointed by 
the mayor. In 1994 and 1995, $4 million was available for rental assistance each year 
through the fund. In addition, in 1994, the city designated $1.4 million in federal HOME 
funds for rental assistance. This latter program, called Affordable Rents for Chicago 
(ARC), was discontinued in 1995. 
In 1994, about 5 7 percent of all of the units created for people earning under 
$15,000 (30 percent of the median family income in metropolitan Chicago) were created 
through the Low Income Housing Trust Fund. The Trust Fund provides one-year 
commitments to subsidize the rents in particular buildings. Short-term commitments to 
low-income housing are easily abandoned, meaning that tenants and property owners 
benefitting from the program can never be sure that the money will still be around in a few 
months. This problem may make the program especially impotent for maintaining low-
income rents in neighborhoods that are gentrifying. As rents increase in such an area, the 
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costs to the Trust Fund also increase. Board members may choose, under such 
circumstances, to drop funding for the project. Moreover, since funding is only awarded 
when landlords apply, tenants are vulnerable to owner's who decide that market rents 
would suit them better and those who decide to sell in a hot market. 
Low Income Housing Tax Credits 
As part of its tax reform effort in 1986, Congress created the Low Income 
Housing Tax Credit (Guggenheim 1992). The tax credit program promised high returns 
to investors if they supported the creation of housing affordable to lower income people. 
The federal government distributes its total tax credit budget to the states on the basis of 
total population. Certain governmental agencies within each state are designated to 
distribute the credits. In Illinois, the Illinois Housing Development Authority (IHDA) and 
the City of Chicago Department of Housing serve in this capacity. Within Chicago, 
developers apply to DOH if they're interested in this source of financing. If their 
application is successful, the developers then assume control of the credits. Usually, 
developers can't use the credits directly. They need money immediately to purchase and 
renovate a building. So, they sell the credits to corporations who can benefit from the tax 
break the credit offers them. In Chicago, the sale is usually handled by a syndicator like 
the Chicago Equity Fund (CEF). CEF pools money from corporate investors, buys the tax 
credits from developers of affordable housing, then distributes the credits back to their 
investors. In exchange for the credits, developers receive equity funds from the 
corporations through CEF. 
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Corporations which purchase tax credits in this way receive direct write-downs on 
the amount of federal income tax they owe. So, if Mega-Big Corporation purchases 
$100,000 in tax credits in 1994 and owes $200,000 in federal income tax for the same 
year, they will only need to pay $100,000. Corporations must spread their use of tax 
credits out equally over a ten year period. That is, if Mega-Big purchases $1 million in tax 
credits, they will cut $100,000 off their federal tax due every year for the next ten years. 
When developers sell tax credits to corporations through syndicators like CEF, 
they generally receive about 50 cents for every dollar of tax credit they sell. So, if the 
People's Voice Housing Corporation sells $100,000 in tax credits, they will generally 
receive $50,000 in equity funds. This money is generally paid out over five years. 
Corporations and syndicators justify the price by pointing out that they are paying out the 
money in five years while the tax credits accrue to them over a ten year period. 
When they purchase tax credits, corporations gain not only a direct tax write-
down. They also gain an equity position in the housing project itself The money they pay 
is used as equity which enables the developer to secure other loans. In legal terms, the 
corporations become limited partners in the project. Legally, then, corporate tax credit 
investors have some ownership control over what happens to the housing project over 
time. Tax credit legislation requires that housing using credits as financing must remain 
affordable to low-income renters for at least 15 years (Schwartz, Ferlauto, and Hoffinan 
1988, p. 150). Once this period is up, corporations may be tempted to exercise their 
ownership rights, especially when the property is located in a gentrifying neighborhood. 
The tax credit program has existed only since 1986, nine years ago as of the writing of this 
thesis. Once the fifteen year period expires on the first tax credit projects, we will see 
whether corporations choose to exercise this option. 
39 
In 1994, the City of Chicago had $16 million in tax credits to distribute for project 
financing. In 1995, $17.4 million was allocated for this purpose. 
Multifamily Rehab and New Construction program 
Through this program, developers of affordable housing in the city receive low-
interest loans to help them to either rehabilitate existing multi-unit housing or to construct 
new multi-unit buildings. Funding for the program comes primarily through direct federal 
subsidies. In particular, the 1995 program is funded through a combination of federal 
HOME funds, federal Community Development Block Grant funds, federal Section 108 
Multifamily Program funding, a city-financed match of federal HOME funds, and a federal 
earmark for HIV/AIDS housing. In 1994, a total of$38,062,250 was allocated through 
the Multifamily Rehab and New Construction program. In 1995, the dollars available to 
the program increased to $51,016,707. No other program was allocated even half this 
amount in 1995. Forty-one percent of all the units DOH claimed to have created in 1994 
were created through this program and a similar pattern was developing in 1995. In many 
ways, then, this program is the department's flagship. 
Generally, developers who receive funding through the Multifamily Rehab and 
New Construction program use the loan as a second mortgage to supplement their 
purchase and rehabilitation or construction costs. Interest rates provided on these loans 
by DOH in most cases run between zero percent and three percent. Monthly payments 
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also tend to be low, with a balloon payment scheduled for the end of the loan term. 
Amortization schedules vary from loan to loan. Some loans are scheduled to be forgiven 
at the end of the loan schedule, as long as the loan recipient continues to provide housing 
for the intended purpose (e.g., housing for the homeless). 
Developers generally use Multifamily Rehab and New Construction loans in 
combination with several other funding sources, since no single funding source is capable 
of covering construction and operation costs while maintaining the very low rents poor 
people require. Even with multiple funding sources, developers generally cannot provide 
rents affordable to people earning extremely low incomes without also accessing direct 
rental subsidies. Usually, this means that developers oflow-income housing must obtain 
Section 8 funds. In 1994, 93 percent of all the units created by non-profits were 
affordable to people earning under $15,000 annually. Amazingly, a full 97 percent of all 
these very low-income units were created using Section 8 money. The remaining three 
percent used the city's Affordable Rents for Chicago program, which was discontinued in 
1995, to keep rents low. Much of the Section 8 money accessed for these projects was 
project-based. This is surprising, since project-based Section 8 funding has been 
drastically reduced in the last 15 years, as I noted in Chapter 2. The Stewart B. McKinney 
Homeless Assistance Act of 1987 created project-based Section 8 funds for SRO housing. 
Some non-profits accessed McKinney money in 1994 to create affordable housing for 
single individuals who might otherwise be homeless. Other developers got hold of Section 
8 money by purchasing HUD-owned properties which have provided low-income housing 
for many years. 
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The reality that developers must access Section 8 funds in order to provide very 
low-income rents severely limits the types of projects which can be produced. McKinney 
funds support the creation of SRO housing, but no equivalent funds exist to support family 
housing. Developers may on occasion purchase HUD-owned properties which offer 
project-based subsidies, but in so doing they are rarely adding to the market of low-
income housing, since HUD-owned properties often are housing low-income tenants 
before they are sold. Finally, developers may access Section 8 funds by renting only to 
tenants who hold Section 8 certificates, but these people generally are not in need of 
housing. Their certificates provide them significant leverage in obtaining a quality unit on 
the open market. 
Multifamily Rehab and New Construction loans are rarely combined with funds 
from the Low Income Housing Trust Fund, the city's rental subsidy program. Combining 
these funds would seemingly end the reliance oflocal developers on Section 8 financing. 
Since Trust Fund subsidies are only guaranteed for one year, however, banks and other 
lending agencies will not build a loan package based upon this sort of assistance. If they 
did, and the project was refused Trust Fund money the following year, the loan would 
likely go into default. 
Spending On "Housing Creation" in 1994 and 1995 
Table 1 provides a list of all DOH "housing creation" programs in 1994, including 
the total amount of funds allocated for each program, the total amount actually spent, and 
the total number of units funded, according to DOH reports. This general information is 
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important background information for analyzing the department's spending patterns. 1995 
expenditures are described in Table 2. 
TABLE 1 
1994 HOUSING CREATION PROGRAMS, 
WITH ALLOCATIONS, EXPENDITURES, AND UNITS FUNDED 
Program 1994 Allocation 1994 Expenditures Units Funded 
Affordable Housing Bond $6,000,000 $0* 0 
Initiative 
Low Income Housing Trust Fund $5,600,000 $5,271,719 1529 
CDBG Float Loans $20,000,000 $0 0 
Housing Revenue Bonds $10,000,000 $0 0 
City Fee Waivers $700,000 $550,695 18 
Tax Increment Financing $2,000,000 $1,808,000 96 
Multifamily Rehab & New $38,062,250 $50,387 ,376 1742 
Construction 
Single Family Rehab $850,000 $321,543 10 
New Homes for Chicago $2,687,500 $1,686,000 92 
Low Income Housing Tax Credits $16,000,000 $19, 101,559 789 
TOTALS $101,899,750 $79,127,288 4276 
* $2, 000, 000 of the $6, 000, 000 originally allocated for the Affordable Housing Bond 
Initiative was spent in the Multifamily Rehab and New Construction program. 
Source: City of Chicago Department of Housing, Fourth Quarter 1994 Report. January 
17, 1995. 
TABLE 2 
1995 HOUSING CREATION PROGRAMS, 
WITH ALLOCATIONS, EXPENDITURES, AND UNITS FUNDED 
THROUGH JULY 31, 1995 
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Program 1995 Allocation 1995 Expenditures Units Funded 
Affordable Housing Bond $6,000,000 $11,725,632 229 
Initiative 
Low Income Housing Trust Fund $4,000,000 $4,000,019 1472 
CDBG Float Loans $20,000,000 $3,060,000 102 
Housing Revenue Bonds $10,000,000 $0 0 
City Fee Waivers $700,000 $236,708 6 
Tax Increment Financing $2,000,000 $0 0 
Multifamily Rehab & New $51,016,707 $21,713,660 770 
Construction 
Housing Opportunities for NIA 385,000 34 
Persons with AIDS 
Mortgage Credit Certificate $25,000,000 $6,883,120 84 
Program 
CAPP Financing $350,000 $103,216 4 
Single Family Rehab $1,165,000 $77,300 2 
Homebuyer's Assistance $250,000 $10,422 7 
New Homes for Chicago $2,500,000 $720,000 36 
Low Income Housing Tax Credits $17,400,000 $18,695,031 981 
TOTALS $140,381,707 $67,610,108 3727 
Source: City of Chicago Department of Housing, Second Quarter 1995 Report. July 24, 
1995. 
Housing Policy Conducted by Other Government Entities 
Other government entities operate programs which directly affect the housing 
stock available to low-income Chicagoans. The Chicago Housing Authority (CHA), for 
example, handles all programs associated with public housing in the city. All public 
housing projects and Section 8 rental certificate programs, for example, fall under the 
purview of the CHA The CHA is not directly controlled by City of Chicago. The 
housing authority is directly responsible to the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD), not to City Hall. 
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Certain city departments which are directly responsible to Mayor Daley also 
control portions of the housing policy affecting city residents. Indeed, most city 
departments affect the city's housing stock in one important way or another. Those which 
exert perhaps the most direct influence are discussed below. 
The Department of Planning and Development (DPD) handles land use planning 
for the city. These decisions have broad implications for Chicago's housing stock. DPD, 
for instance, is empowered to create Redevelopment Zones in areas of the city deemed 
"blighted." Within these zones, the department may use eminent domain powers to take 
control of property and then sell it to developers whose plans are commensarate with the 
city's planning agenda in the area. 
The Department of Buildings controls the demolition of properties and handles 
inspections of city buildings allegedly in violation of the city's building code. The 
Department of Buildings also administered the Chicago Abandoned Property Program 
(CAPP), discussed later in this thesis, before the program was transferred to DOH 
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The General Services Department handles the administration of the city-owned 
real estate in Chicago. The amount of land owned by the city is considerable, especially in 
low-income neighborhoods struggling through periods of sustained disinvestment. The 
Chicago Tribune claims, for example, that 70 percent of the land in the south side 
community of Woodlawn is vacant and half of the vacant land is owned by the city 
(Longworth 1994, p. 7). In Woodlawn, the city is selling several lots to developers of 
upper-income housing. When the city makes decisions to sell its property, the results 
affect Chicago neighborhoods for years to come. 
Finally, the Department of Law handles the legal questions which often accompany 
the distribution of city funds or property. When DOH provides a low-interest loan to a 
developer through its Multifamily Rehab and New Construction program, for example, the 
Department of Law must approve the transaction. In addition, Department of Law 
attorneys prosecute cases brought before the city's Housing Court. These cases involve 
violations of the city's building code. The extensive case load includes, as a result, many 
of Chicago's most dilapidated properties. Buildings in low-income, minority 
neighborhoods are, not surprisingly, over-represented. Housing court judges may, under 
appropriate circumstances, order the property's owner fined or even jailed, and may order 
the building demolished. 
CHAPTERS 
ANALYSIS OF DOH EXPENDITURES AND PROGRAMS 
In this section, I will analyze the City of Chicago Department of Housing's 1994 
and 1995 expenditures and programs. 1995 data is complete only through July 31, 1995, 
though some programs had already spent all of money they were allocated in 1995 by this 
date. All analyses, tables, and figures are based entirely upon data provided by the 
department itself in public, quarterly reports to the City Council Committee on Housing 
and Real Estate. My argument is, I think, strengthened by the fact that I am analyzing 
DOH' s programs and expenditures based on the department's own numbers. 
Reporting and Administrative Problems 
Overcounting 
In all of its 1994 reports, DOH double-counted and sometimes triple-counted the 
units that it claimed to create. When the same project received financing from more than 
one DOH subsidy program, these units are counted twice and sometimes three times. The 
department's final 1994 report overcounts the units that it created by at least 791 units as a 
result. The actual number may be higher, since my analysis was limited to only those 
programs for which DOH provided the necessary detail in their quarterly reports. 
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Conservatively speaking, then, at least 18 percent of the 4,276 units DOH claimed to 
create in 1994 were not created at all (see Table 3). 
Such overcounting is important, since it implies that more affordable housing is 
being created annually in the city than is actually occurring. Planning based on these 
TABLE3 
NUMBER OF UNITS DOH CLAIMED TO CREATE, 
VARIOUS PROPERTIES FUNDED BY THE DEPARTMENT, 1994 
Address #Units #Units #Units Total Units Total Units 
Receiving Receiving Receiving In Project DOH 
Multifamily Tax Trust Counted 
Rehab Credits Fund 
Funds Money 
6034 S. Prairie 33 33 0 33 66 
5012 N. Winthrop 160 160 0 160 320 
334 N. Menard 57 57 0 57 114 
6100 S. Wabash 24 24 0 24 48 
1900 S. Harding 48 48 14 48 110 
5000 W. Monroe 15 0 4 15 19 
4655 S. Lake Park 116 116 0 116 332 
542 N. Pine 166 166 0 166 332 
6 N. Hamlin 276 0 70 276 346 
1131 S. Sacramento 11 0 3 11 14 
2345 E. 67th 96 96 0 96 192 
TOTALS 1002 700 91 1002 1793 




numbers would be wrong-headed from the beginning. Slippery counting procedures may 
make the department appear to be producing larger numbers of affordable housing units, 
but they hardly help us to help low-income people, even though DOH may not been 
intentionally devious. The department may have overcounted its units simply because it is 
easier in a large bureacracy to compartmentalize reporting procedures. Complex tracking 
systems are required to generate an "unduplicated" count, though computers make 
developing such systems more possible. Lipsky (1980) points out, moreover, that social 
service providers may try to increase the number of clients they serve for a variety of 
reasons, including maximizing funding levels. In arguing that the department's 
overcounting procedures were wrong, I would not wish to undercut their federal funding. 
Perhaps overcounting needs to be addressed nationwide, to assure that no single local 
government is disadvantaged. The count as conducted in 1994, at any rate, is misleading 
to policy analysts and the general public. 
After various alderman on the City Council Committee on Housing and Real 
Estate confronted Commissioner Carrott with their concerns about the double- and 
triple-counting detailed in my research for the Chicago Rehab Network, the commissioner 
agreed to discontinue this practice. In presenting the 1995 reports, as a result, the 
department has clarified their figures. The 1995 reports include an "unduplicated" count 
of the number of units benefitting from DOH programs. The commissioner made no 
promise, however, to alter the total count in other public documents; hence, a duplicated 
count may (or may not) be used in marketing materials and in reports to HUD. 
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Counting Shelter Beds 
Department of Housing programs, on occasion, benefit organizations which 
provide shelter beds to Chicago's homeless population. The department, for example, 
provides loans which help fund the rehabilitation of certain properties to be used as 
shelters. Through the Low-Income Housing Trust Fund, DOH sometimes provides rental 
assistance to shelter developers, thus helping to defray the costs of housing the homeless. 
When the department reported this assistance in 1994 and 1995, it counted each shelter 
bed created as a "unit created." That is, the department took credit for creating a unit of 
affordable housing in the city whenever its funding assured that a shelter bed would be 
available to homeless Chicagoans. For example, in the first quarter of 1995, the 
department provided rental assistance through the Low Income Housing Trust Fund to a 
shelter located at 108 N. Sangomon. The rental assistance helped to subsidize 25 shelter 
beds. Subsequently, in its quarterly report, DOH counted the shelter beds it subsidized as 
"units created." In total, during the years 1994 and 1995, the department counted 120 
shelter beds subsidized through its programs as "units created." 
DOH assistance for shelter beds is an appropriate use of department resources. 
The homeless population in Chicago, according to a brochure produced by the non-profit 
housing development group Lakefront SRO, is as high as 50,000, though the city 
estimates the number to be much smaller. Keeping a legitimate count of the number of 
units of affordable housing created in the city annually is also important, however. 
Helping to subsidize a shelter bed does not constitute creating affordable housing. While 
the department deserves credit for helping shelter providers, it should count the number of 
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beds it helps fund separately from the number of housing units it creates. 
Considering that the department's overall count was skewed by including shelter 
beds and by double- and triple-counting units that received funds from more than one 
financing program, DOH's final 1994 total of"units created" is significantly higher than 
the number actually produced. Pat Wright of the Nathalie P. Voorhees Center at the 
University of Illinois at Chicago attempted in a 1995 unpublished study to count the 
unduplicated total number of housing units produced by DOH in 1994. She concluded 
that the department actually supported the creation of 3, 613 units of affordable housing. I 
counted an unduplicated total of 3,388 units supported, not including shelter beds. By 
contrast, DOH claims in its final 1994 report to have created 4,276 units. 
Slow Loan Processing Time 
Low-interest loans at the Department of Housing are provided to developers of 
affordable housing through the Multifamily Rehab and New Construction program, as 
discussed earlier (see Multifamily Rehab and New Construction program, in Chapter 3). 
My analysis of those loans which closed during 1994 and 1995 reveals that, on average, 
the department required nearly one year to process the typical application. As Table 4 
indicates, DOH typically requires over eleven months from the date they receive an 
application to close the deal. The table lists all projects being processed in 1994 for which 
the necessary information was available in DOH reports. Hence, program applicants can 
expect to close on their DOH loan nearly one year from the time they submit their 
application. After closing, applicants must still wait to actually recieve their money from 
the department. DOH does not maintain data on the length of this final waiting period. 
The excessive length of the loan processing process at DOH holds up deals that 
otherwise would be providing housing for low-income Chicagoans much more quickly. 
Because the deals remain in the pipeline, developers are often unable to pursue other 
projects. Hence, while the creation oflow-income housing in Chicago is desperately 
needed, the capacity of developers to produce units is slowed by administrative 
sluggishness within DOH. 
Possible Favoritism In Loan Process 
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Some evidence exists that certain developers may enjoy a degree of favoritism 
when their loans are processed. Such favoritism is difficult to prove conclusively, but the 
data in Table 5 suggests that one developer - Senior Lifestyles, Inc. - may receive 
preferential treatment. Senior Lifestyles is owned by the Klutznick family, which the 
Chicago Tribune calls "politically prominent" (Kass 1995, p. 6). The average loan 
submitted by the Klutnicks was processed in five months (see Table 5). As we saw above, 
the average loan processed during 1994 took over eleven months to process, including the 
Klutznick loans. If we compute the average processing time for all loans in process in 
1994 excluding Klutznick loans, we find that DOH averaged nearly 13 months to process 
all non-Klutnick loans. That is, loans to Senior Lifestyles, Inc. averaged five months to 
process. All other loans processed during 1994 averaged nearly 13 months. 
All three of the Klutnick loans were used to create senior citizen housing with 
studios ranging in rent from $416 to $535 and one-bedrooms ranging from $446 to $535. 
TABLE4 
PROCESSING TIME, FROM APPLICATION TO CLOSING -
MULTIFAMILY REHAB LOANS IN PROCESS DURING 1994 
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Project Address Application City Council Closing Date Total # Months 
Date Approval In Process 
334 N. Menard 9129193 4113/94 8/12/94 10 
6100 S. Wabash 8/1193 5/4/94 9/29/94 14 
1900 S. Harding 10/13/93 5/4/94 9/21194 11 
6037 W. Grand 1111194 514194 716194 6 
5000 W. Monroe 1111193 5118/94 8/5/94 9 
4848 N. Winthrop 3123193 616194 12/21/94 21 
8954 S. Commercial 4/11/93 1017/93 5/10/94 13 
3417 W. Lexington 4/1/93 9/15/93 6/27/94 15 
4655 S. Lake Park 2110/94 7113/94 9/1194 7 
5846 S. King Drive 10/93 7113/94 2/8/95 15 
3244 w. 59th 4/24/94 8/3/94 9/2/94 4 
303 W. Barry 4/6/94 9/14/94 10/31194 7 
1152 W. Christiana 6120192 8/4/93 9119/94 27 
542 N. Pine 10/20/93 10/5/94 12/13/94 14 
6750 N. Green 6/1/94 10/5/94 2127195 9 
7722 N. Marshfield 9/1194 10/10/94 12/31194 4 
2345 E. 67th 1017194 12/21194 3/8/95 5 
AVERAGE 11.2 




1994 LOANS TO SENIOR LIFESTYLES, INC. 
Project Address # Months from Application to Closing 
6037 W. Grand 6 
3244 w. 59th 4 
2345 E. 67th 5 
AVERAGE 5 
Source: City of Chicago Department of Housing, various 1994 and 1995 quarterly 
reports. 
The apparent favoritism granted to the Klutnicks is especially troubling given the 
historical use of senior citizen housing as a gentrification strategy. Community 
organizations who desire the racial and economic gentrification of their neighborhood 
sometimes pursue developers who provide senior citizen housing. Seniors often need 
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housing that is similar in size and cost to low-income minority individuals; so, in attracting 
these developments to their neighborhood, some community organizations cut the supply 
of housing to the low-income minorities that they wish to exclude. Of course, low-cost 
housing for senior citizens is an important niche in the city's housing market, and the 
creation of senior housing does not necessarily imply gentrification or maliciousness in any 
way. Since the Klutnicks appear to receive favorable treatment at DOH, though, and 
because the rents that they charge fall within a relatively high range, the concerns 
described above are valid until new information is made available. 
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Difficulty Spending Allocations for New Programs 
The department failed to spend any or much of the money allocated to certain of 
its programs in 1994. This trend continued into 1995. For example, DOH failed to spend 
over $36 million in new program funds that were allocated for affordable housing by the 
City Council in 1994. Four new programs at the department were allocated a total of 
$36,850,000 for affordable housing in the 1994 budget. DOH spent only $321,543 ofthis 
money within the programs for which the money was originally intended (see Table 6). 
It should be noted that $2 million of the $6 million originally allocated for the 
Affordable Housing Bond Initiative program was transferred to the Multifamily Rehab and 
New Construction program and spent there. Even considering this transfer of funds, 
however, the department only spent a small percentage of the funds it was allocated for 
these programs. 
The department's difficulty in spending money allocated for these programs may 
reflect a variety of problems. Commissioner Carrott, in the narrative section of the 
TABLE 6 
VARIOUSDOHPROGRAMS-
1994 ALLOCATION, EXPENDITURES 
Program 1994 Allocation 1994 Expenditures 
Affordable Housing Bond Initiative $6,000,000 $0 
CDBG Float Loans $20,000,000 $0 
Housing Revenue Bonds $10,000,000 $0 
Single Family Rehab $850,000 $321,543 
Source:City of Chicago Department ofHousing, Fourth Quarter 1994 Report. Jan 17, '95. 
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department's fourth quarter report in 1994, explains that money for the Affordable 
Housing Bond Initiative program was not available to DOH because the Illinois Housing 
Development Authority (IHDA) "remained unresponsive to DOH attempts to employ 
$2,000,000 of our funds for the purpose of writing down the rate of interest on 
$6,000,000 of proceeds from an IHDA affordable housing bond." Analyzing the 
legitimacy of this claim is beyond the scope this study of DOH quarterly reports. 
Certainly problems such as the one Commissioner Carrott describes may legitimately stall 
the department's ability to spend funds originally allocated by City Council. 
Commissioner Carrott does not mention similar problems with other programs, however. 
The department's difficulty in spending money in other programs may reflect other 
problems. The Chicago Rehab Network (CRN), a coalition of 37 non-profit housing 
development organizations in the city, claims that DOH fails to adequately market new 
programs to the low-income housing development community or to provide effective 
technical assistance regarding the use of these funds. Developers swamped by the 
difficulties of purchasing, renovating, and managing properties with resources that are 
often severely stretched cannot be expected to pursue new funding sources which they 
know little about. Funding sources for low-income housing change with a regularity that 
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rattles the minds of developers. As Maureen Hellwig, director of the economic 
development program at a Chicago community organization, complains in a CRN 
newsletter, "Just when not-for-profit developers get the hang of it, when they figure out 
how to crank out a significant number of housing units, the resource they have mastered 
runs out or is eliminated by Congress" (Hellwig 1994, p. 10). Since funding sources 
change at the federal level change so regularly, new programs at the city level which are 
not aggressively marketed can be expected to be poorly accessed until developers have 
time to learn how to use them. 
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Through the second quarter of 1995, DOH had failed to spend any money at all 
through both the Housing Revenue Bonds program and the Tax Increment Financing 
program. Moreover, the department, halfway through the year, had spent only 4 percent 
of the money originally allocated for the Homebuyer' s Assistance program, only 7 percent 
of the money allocated for Single Family Rehab, and only 15 percent of the money 
available through the CDBG Float Loans program. 
Problems With Where the Money Goes 
Inequitable Subsidies Across Income Groups 
As mentioned previously, the Multifamily Rehab and New Construction program is 
DOH' s flagship, responsible for forty-one percent of all units the department claims to 
have created in 1994. This program receives more than double the total allocation 
provided to any other DOH program. Perhaps not surprisingly, as a result, DOH provided 
more detail about the projects funded through this program than through any other in 
1994. My analysis of DOH subsidies provided through the Multifamily Rehab and New 
Construction program revealed striking inequities across the income groups served. 
More precisely, the size of DOH subsidies provided per unit through this program 
in 1994 increases as the income of the people served increases. Indeed, the size of the 
subsidies provided per unit when the highest-income people benefitted were well more 
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than double the size of the per unit subsidy when the poorest people benefitted (see Table 
7). 
When DOH reports information about a Multifamily Rehab loan that the 
department funded, it discloses the number of units created, the rents of each of those 
units and the incomes of the people who can afford those rents. The department uses an 
equation based on the widely accepted concept that households can afford approximately 
one-third of their monthly income for rent. In many cases, rents vary within a single 
project. As a result, a variety of income groups are often served by one building. 
Regardless of the number of income groups served, DOH provides only one loan per 
project. So, in developing Table 7, I faced a problem. How should a single subsidy be 
divided among the various income groups benefitting from it? I chose a logical course of 
action. I divided the total loan by the number of units created, to produce a "per 
unit subsidy." Then, I doled out the per unit subsidy to each income group by multiplying 
it by the number of units that benefitted each group. For example, if the per unit subsidy 
provided by the department were $1000 on a 20-unit building and the loan created 10 
units affordable to people earning under $8000 and another 10 units affordable to people 
earning from $8000 to $15,000, then I deduce that the department spent $10,000 on 
people earning under $8000 and another $10, 000 to help people earning between $8000 
and $15,000. 
Because government subsidies are relatively low, non-profit housing development 
organizations committed to providing affordable housing to the poorest of Chicago's 
citizens have a hard time both succeeding in their mission and covering their debt 
TABLE 7 
AVERAGE PER UNIT SUBSIDY, BY INCOME LEVEL -
MULTIFAMILY REHAB AND NEW CONSTRUCTION LOANS 
$0-8000 $8 - 15,000 $15- 24,000 $24- 29,000 $29- 38,000 
Source: City of Chicago Department of Housing, various 1994 and 1995 quarterly 
reports. 
(Cordova 1991, p. 37). If the department is providing larger per unit loans to higher 
income projects, the work of non-profits is made even more difficult. 
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The analysis described above does not consider unit size in determining the amount 
of subsidy provided. This fact may cause my results to be misleading. Small units like 
studio apartments cost less to develop than larger units. If most of the units created for 
lower income people were studios, then the subsidy differences my analysis reveals may 
result from the lower cost of creating smaller units, not a bias against lower income 
people. In fact, though, only 51 percent of the units affordable to people earning under 
$8000 annually created through the Multifamily Rehab and New Construction program in 
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1994 were studios. The rest were a mix of one, two, and three bedroom units. Moreover, 
over 45 percent of the units affordable to households earning more than $24,000 annually 
were studios. A difference in the unit sizes created for various income groups does not 
appear to account for the differences in subsidies I described above. 
Subsidizing Rents Already Provided By the Open Market 
In some cases, DOH provides subsidies to developers who create housing with 
rents equal to or above the rents available on the private, open market in the same 
neighborhood. As Table 8 shows, rents charged in 1994 at DOH-subsidized projects were 
equal or higher to typical, private market rents in their community area. The private 
market rent ranges were gathered by the Chicago Sun-Times in December 1994. 
TABLE 8 
RENTS PROVIDED IN SELECTED 1994 DOH-SUBSIDIZED PROJECTS, 
COMPARED TO OPEN MARKET RENTS 
Project address Community Rents in project Rents on the open 
name market in community* 
2345 E. 67th Woodlawn 1 BR - $446-535 1 BR- $310-410 
1443 W. Fruwell Rogers Park I BR - $525-650 I BR - $425-575 
2 BR-$650 2 BR - $635-825 
7728 N. Marshfield Rogers Park Studio - $375 Studio - $375-450 
1 BR - $425-475 I BR - $425-575 
* Open market rent ranges were gathered by the Chicago Sun-Times in December 
1994. 
Source: City of Chicago Department of Housing, various 1994 and 1995 quarterly 
reports. 
Government subsidies are intended to provide housing to those people that the 
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open, unsubsidized market is failing to reach. DOH, in subsidizing the projects in Table 8, 
appears to be spending money on projects that do not need it. Other developers are 
providing the same rents in those neighborhoods without government assistance. My data 
raises the question, "Who is really benefitting from these projects?" 
Of course, the units receiving DOH subsidies in 1994 are freshly rehabilitated and 
in many cases offer attractive amenities that may not be offered in apartments on the open 
market. The costs of creating high quality units may justify rents that are higher than most 
rents in the neighborhood. I do not intend to suggest that DOH is purposefully lining the 
pockets of developers. I do suggest that the department is choosing to allocate its funds 
to projects with relatively high rents. As a result, developers in some neighborhoods may 
be able to provide units of a higher quality than is generally available on the market, but 
they also fail to provide housing for those most in need in the local neighborhood. My 
argument throughout this paper has been that the department's subsidies, when so 
allocated, are misplaced. 
Part of the reason that DOH is subsidizing rents already available on the private 
market in Chicago is that federal guidelines establish a strange method of determining who 
qualifies as "low-income." ·This allows DOH to suggest that it is serving low-income 
people when, in fact, it is not. Guidelines established at the U.S. Department of Housing 
and Urban Development define "low-income" people as those households who are earning 
less than a certain percentage of their area's median household income. The problem is 
that, for Chicago, the "area" is defined as including several relatively wealthy suburban 
counties. As a result, the median income employed is quite high. This method of 
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calculation allows DOH to provide housing subsidies to people at relatively high income 
levels and yet claim that "low-income" people are being served. Many of the department's 
programs, for example, are designed to benefit people earning up to 80 percent of the 
"area median income." Using the calculation strategy described above, DOH may provide 
subsidies through these programs to benefit families of four earning nearly $40,000. 
Indeed, because of the way the percentages are figured, some city subsidies benefit 
families earning up to $62,000 annually. 
The rents that are created in DOH projects may be quite high, as a result. 
According to the department's final 1994 report, 3 8 percent of all "housing creation" 
money benefitted people earning over thirty percent of the "area median income," about 
$15,000 (in 1994 dollars) for a family of four. Nelson (1994) studied housing needs 
nationally and determined that new subsidized housing is not needed by lower income 
groups earning more than 30 percent of"area median income." If Nelson's data applies in 
Chicago, then nearly $4 out of every $10 spent on affordable housing in the city goes to 
people who are not in great need. My data comparing DOH-subsidized rents to rents 
already available on the open market, though clearly inconclusive, also suggests that DOH 
spending is misplaced. 
Moreover, of those units DOH supported in 1994 which were affordable to people 
earning under thirty percent of the area median income, fifty-four percent were created 
through the Low Income Housing Trust Fund. The rents created through this program 
are guaranteed for one year only. Funding cuts and developer fancy may quickly 
annihilate the gains made by the program and the low-income people who benefit from it. 
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Focus On Smaller Units 
Federal regulation earlier this decade required that all municipalities receiving 
federal housing assistance file a five-year plan for creating affordable housing called the 
Comprehensive Housing Afford ability Strategy (CHAS). In the 1993 CHAS, writers for 
the City of Chicago stated, "The Community Profile indicates that families are particularly 
disadvantaged in their search for affordable housing. The city will encourage the 
provision of a balance of adequate units for large as well as small households in 
rehabilitating multi-family buildings." The CHAS writers may have been encouraged to 
pledge their assistance to families because the number of larger unit apartments in the city 
decreased dramatically during the 1980s. Four bedroom rental units declined by 16.9 
percent during that decade (T. Wright 1995, p. 175). 
Despite the city's intentions, 65 percent of the units created by DOH through the 
Multifamily Rehab and New Construction program in 1994 were either shelter beds, SRO 
units, studios, or one-bedrooms. Indeed, 55 percent of the units created contained no 
bedroom at all (see Figure 1). 
This focus on smaller units also exists in other programs. Data on the Low 
Income Housing Trust Fund (LIHTF) and the Low Income Housing Tax Credit program 
for 1995 is analyzed in Figures 2 and 3, respectively, revealing a pattern similar to that 
exposed in the Multifamily Rehab and New Construction program. This data for 1995 is 
appropriately analyzed, since both the LIHTF program and the tax credit program had 
essentially spent all of their allocated money for the year by July 31, 1995, when I stopped 
gathering data for this thesis. No other unit of housing will be created through either of 
these programs for the remainder of the year. 
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In part, the tendency of the department to create small unit sizes is accounted for 
by the fact that buildings with smaller units tend to contain more units. So when DOH 
provides money to support the rehabilitation of a studio building, it tends to create more 
units than when it supports the rehabilitation of a building with larger units. On the other 
hand, DOH is clearly supporting many more households who need studio or one-bedroom 
apartments than families who need larger units. This heavy emphasis raises questions 
about whether this strategy fits with the housing needs of Chicagoans. The city's CHAS 
did not agree. Homeless advocates such as the Chicago Coalition for the Homeless and 
Lakefront SRO argue that "single-room occupancy" housing is desperately needed to help 
homeless individuals move from the street into the mainstream and to house people who 
might otherwise be homeless. Since 1975, about 20,000 SRO units have been lost in the 
city (T. Wright 1995, p. 162). Clearly, money to support the creation of affordable studio 
units is an important effort wholly appropriate for DOH spending. Such a heavy emphasis 
on smaller units, however, is probably not desirable, given drastic losses in larger units in 
recent years and the increasing levels of poverty being experienced by low-income families 
with large numbers of children. As Holeb points out, 47 percent of all African-American 
children in the city are poor (Holeb 1993, p. 79). 
I Studios, beds I 
D Studios, beds = 55% 
12] 1BR=10% 
film 2 BR =22% 
g 3BR=13% 
Fig 1. Unit sizes created in projects funded by the Multifamily Rehab and New 
Construction program, 1994. 
Source: City of Chicago Department of Housing, various 1994 quarterly reports. 
64 
I Studios, SROs I 
D Studio& = 51.8% 
Ed 1BR=23.1% 
mm 2 BR= 19.3% 
II 3BR=5.1% 
• 4 BR= 0.8% 
Fig. 2. Unit sizes created in projects funded by the Low Income Housing Trust Fund, 
1995. 
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Source: City of Chicago Department of Housing, First and Second Quarter 1995 Reports. 
D Studios = 28.1 % 





Fig. 3. Unit sizes created in projects funded by the Low Income Housing Tax Credit, 
1995. 
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Source: City of Chicago Department of Housing, First and Second Quarter 1995 Reports. 
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Inequities in Funds Provided to For-profits Compared to Non-profits 
In 1994, twenty-two low-interest loans provided by DOH through the Multifamily 
Rehab and New Construction program were approved by City Council. Ten of these 
loans were awarded to non-profit organizations. The other twelve were given to for-
profit developers. As Table 9 indicates, DOH provided for-profit developers with loans 
that were, on average, twice as large as the loans provided to non-profit groups. 
At the public hearing before the City Council Committee on Housing and Real 
Estate at which the Department of Housing presented its final 1994 report, Commissioner 
Carrott argued that the discrepancy described in Table 9 occurs because non-profits access 
more of the DOH money available through other programs. The total subsidies provided 
to non-profits and for-profits, the Commissioner implicitly claimed, are similar. The data 
in Table 10, however, disputes her claim. The table shows that the average total subsidy 
provided to for-profit loan recipients was more than double that awarded to non-profit 
groups. 
One might reasonably ask if for-profits were involved in larger projects than non-
profits, so that their average loan is legitimately higher. Even when considered on a "per 
unit" basis, however, the loans DOH gave to for-profits were much larger than those 
provided to non-profits (see Table 11). 
Other apparent inequities exist in the loans provided to for-profit and non-profit 
development groups. A disparity exists, for example, in the size of the developer's fee 
that was allowed by DOH A developer's fee is built into the overall project budget as a 
standard rule of practice. It is awarded to the organization, company, or other entity 
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TABLE9 
AVERAGE DOH LOAN AMOUNT PER MULTIFAMILY REHAB PROJECT, 1994 -
COMPARISON OF LOANS TO NON-PROFITS, FOR-PROFITS 
~ $2,000,000 --1-------------
E .. 
c ..Sl $1,500,000 
... 




Source: City of Chicago Department of Housing, various 1994 quarterly reports. 
TABLE 10 
AVERAGE TOT AL DOH SUBSIDY PROVIDED TO MUL TIF AMIL Y REHAB AND 
NEW CONSTRUCTION LOAN RECIPIENTS 

















Source: City of Chicago Department of Housing, various 1994 quarterly reports. 
TABLE 11 
AVERAGE MULTIFAMILY REHAB LOAN PER UNIT, 1994 -












Source: City of Chicago Department of Housing, various 1994 quarterly reports. 
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responsible for overseeing the project from start to finish. This fee helps the developer to 
overcome his or her purchase and rehabilitation costs, since it may be applied directly to 
the bottom line. For 1994 DOH loans, for-profit groups took a per unit developer's fee 
that was, on average, 50 percent higher than the fee charged by non-profits (see Table 12). 
I was also able to compare, using data available in the DOH reports, the total 
project costs of for-profit and non-profit projects. Total project costs include all of the 
costs of acquisition, construction (or rehabilitation), soft costs such as legal expenses, and 
the developer's fee. The total project costs per unit were nearly 50 percent higher at for-
profit projects, compared to non-profit projects (see Table 13). 
TABLE12 
AVERAGE DEVELOPER'S FEE, PER UNIT CREATED, 
1994 MULTIFAMILY REHAB AND NEW CONSTRUCTION LOANS -




















Source: City of Chicago Department of Housing, various 1994 quarterly reports. 
We might expect "total project costs" at non-profit projects to be lower than the 
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costs of for-profit projects, if non-profits were creating units that cost less to create. For 
example, if non-profits were rehabilitating buildings filled with studios and for-profits were 
rehabbing a lot of three-bedroom units, we might expect their per unit project costs to 
vary accordingly. Smaller unit size should translate to a lower total per unit project cost, 
especially since many studio buildings are large apartment buildings which create a 
beneficial economy of scale for the developer. 
Indeed, 49 percent of the units created through the Multifamily Rehab and New 
TABLE 13 
AVERAGE "TOTAL PROJECT COSTS" PER UNIT CREATED, 
1994 MULTIFAMILY REHAB AND NEW CONSTRUCTION LOANS -

















Source: City of Chicago Department of Housing, various 1994 quarterly reports. 
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Construction program in 1994 by non-profits were either studios or shelter beds. The 15 
percent of these units which were shelter beds were created in projects which averaged per 
unit "total project costs" of only $31,825. 
On the other hand, a full 60 percent of the units created by for-profit developers 
were studio units. Only 31 percent of the units created by for-profits contained two or 
more bedrooms, compared with 40 percent of the non-profit units. 
For-profit project costs, moreover, were higher than non-profit costs even when 
unit sizes are held constant. The studios rehabilitated by non-profits were generated in 
projects which averaged $44,496 in "total project costs" per unit. All of these units were 
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created in projects which contained mostly studio units. For-profit studios, by 
comparison, were renovated in projects which averaged $67, 153 in per unit "total project 
costs." The for-profit figure excludes one project which contains studios, because most of 
the units in the building are two- or three-bedroom units. 
Despite the various disparities outlined above, non-profit groups tended to provide 
housing to people at much lower income levels than for-profit developers. In fact, a full 
ninety percent of the units created by non-profit developers in 1994 through the 
Multifamily Rehab and New Construction program were affordable to people earning less 
than $8000 annually, while only seven percent of the units created by for-profit developers 
benefitted people at these lowest income levels (see Table 14). By the way, when we 
consider households earning under $15,000 a year, the results are similar. Fully 93 
percent of the units created by non-profits helped people in this larger income range, while 
only 18 percent of for-profit units benefitted these households. 
Funding Demolition. Not Rehabilitation: The CAPP Program 
The Chicago Abandoned Property Program (CAPP) is not considered a "housing 
creation" program. However, the program is administered by the Department of Housing 
and data regarding the program is provided in the department's report for the first quarter 
of 1995. Therefore, I include an analysis of this program, based entirely upon the data 
provided in the report. 
CAPP was designed to get structurally sound, vacant properties into the hands of 
developers who will renovate them. The program accepts properties only if they ·are 
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TABLE14 
MULTIFAMILY REHAB AND NEW CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS, 1994 
PERCENT OF UNITS AFFORDABLE TO HOUSEHOLDS 
EARNING UNDER $8000 ANNUALLY, 
NON-PROFIT V.S. FOR-PROFIT PROJECTS 
Non-profits For-profits 
Source: City of Chicago Department of Housing, various 1994 quarterly reports. 
structurally sound enough to be rehabbed. Since the inception of the program three years 
ago, only 10 buildings have been renovated (as of March 31, 1995). In contrast, 54 
buildings, or 43 percent of all the properties transferred by the program, have either been 
demolished or are headed towards demolition (see Figure 4). The Department of Housing 
is not fully to blame for these results. The City of Chicago Department of Buildings 
administered the program until November 1993, half the time the program has existed. 
In general, moreover, these properties are not being demolished to make way for 
new affordable housing projects or other new uses that might be beneficial to the city. 
• Demolished= 46, or 37.1% 
~ Referring to demo = 8, or 6.5% 
Ill Seeking financing= 22, or 17.7% 
~ Financing Secured = 17, or 13. 7% 
D Under construction= 17, or 13.7% 
• Rehabilitated = 10, or 8.1 % 
others= 4, or 3.2% 
Fig. 4. Current state of CAPP properties transferred since program inception (1992), as 
of March 31, 1995. 
Source: City of Chicago Department of Housing, First Quarter 1995 Report. April 26, 
1995. 
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After demolition, two-thirds of the CAPP properties are simply added to the rolls of city-
owned property. The largest portion of the remainder become parking lots (see Figure 5). 
This policy is congruent with the drastic increase in city-funded demolitions in the 
1990s. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the Chicago Alliance for Neighborhood Safety points 
out that city allocations for demolition increased from $1.8 million in 1989 to $15 million 
in 1995. 
The city's policy of supporting the demolition of abandoned property facilitates the 
negative housing development cycle I outlined in Chapter 2. Demolishing property, rather 
than encouraging its rehabilitation, exacerbates the disinvestment process in low-income 
• City inventory= 31, or 67.4 
m Parking lot= 6, or 13% 
!iliill New residential= 7, or 15.2 
• New business = 1, or 2.2% 
D Open space = 1, or 2. 2% 
Fig. 5. Current state of all demolished CAPP properties, as of March 31, 1995. 
Source: City of Chicago Department of Housing, First Quarter 1995 Report. April 26, 
1995. 
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neighborhoods. Fewer buildings are available for rehabilitation and land prices continue to 
drop, until investors are encouraged to reinvest in hopes of reaping heavy profits. In the 
meantime, low-income people in the city have less affordable housing available to them 
and the landscape of the neighborhood comes to look more and more like a ghost town. 
Adding the resulting vacant land to the inventory of city-owned land translates to 
significant city control of the future development course of neighborhoods in which many 
buildings have been demolished. In Woodlawn, for example, the city currently owns so 
much land (35 percent of all land in the community, according to the Chicago Tribune) 
that its development decisions will play a vital role in determining the future of the 
neighborhood (Longworth 1994, p. 7). While an analysis of the city's efforts in 
Woodlawn is beyond the scope of this thesis, some activists in the area argue that the city 
is encouraging gentrification by selling their land to developers of upper-income housing 
(Allen 1995, p. 5). 
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My data does not take account of the size of the buildings demolished. It is 
possible that most of the demolished properties contained very small numbers of units 
while those rehabilitate contained very large numbers of units, thus equalizing the effect of 
the city's policy somewhat. I have no data to determine whether or not this was the case. 
At any rate, my data makes clear that the CAPP program is being used in many cases to 
demolish buildings originally intended for rehabilitation. Adding vacant land to the city's 




Chapter 5 presents a significant amount of data which I believe reveals some 
serious problems with the way that the City of Chicago Department of Housing is 
currently managing its programs and allocating its resources. As a result of these 
problems, Chicagoans with desperate housing needs are not being served as well as they 
might. 
Administrative problems such as slow loan processing procedures and failure to 
spend allocated resources, for example, mean that less units of affordable housing are 
produced in the city than might be. Developers could do more deals if the Department of 
Housing processed the papers more quickly. And more deals could be done as well, of 
course, if all of the money the city allocates for affordable housing production were 
actually spent. In 1994 and the first half of 1995, the department was failing in these 
regards. 
In 1994, the department was employing slippery counting procedures in tallying 
the total number of units created with DOH support. Administrative difficulties and a 
desire to look good to funders may encourage overcounting; at any rate, these procedures 
hinder our ability to understand just how much local government is doing to help resolve 
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the pressing housing problems of Chicagoans. The department is to be commended for 
foregoing this procedure in 1995. DOH continues, however, to count shelter beds as 
"units created." Shelter beds provide a short-term solution for homeless people. They do 
not provide a long term solution to the housing problems of low-income people. Creating 
shelter beds is not equivalent to creating units of long-term, affordable housing. 
I also presented evidence which suggests that political favoritism influenced the 
way in which DOH administers its loan process. The applications of one developer, 
Senior Lifestyles, Inc., were processed in an average of five months, while all other loans 
averaged about thirteen months. All of the Senior Lifestyles, Inc. projects benefitted 
senior citizens and provided rents which were high relative to other funded projects. If it's 
true that favoritism accounts for the disparity in loan processing times, DOH is clearly 
prioritizing projects based on the wrong reasons. 
In addition, I showed that the Department of Housing is focusing its production 
efforts on small units of housing, despite a desperate need for larger units in Chicago. 
Studios provide an important avenue for single, low-income individuals to avoid 
homelessness. The drastic reduction in the city's SRO buildings in recent years demands 
that significant resources be allocated to the production of building with studio units. 
However, the need for units containing three or more units is also desperate. DOH's 
overwhelming focus on smaller units assures that the department will have a large number 
of units to report whenever HUD visits town and quiets SRO advocates, but fails to 
adequately address the need for family-sized housing. 
The city is also allocating its money in ways which benefit upper-income projects 
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at the expense oflower-income people. I presented data in Chapter 5 which showed that 
the size of DOH loan subsidies increases as the income of the people served increases. 
This disparity, I argue, cannot be blamed on differences in the size of the units created for 
people at each income level. That is, poorer people did not get less subsidy because their 
units were smaller, and therefore cheaper. Only 51 percent of the Multifamily Rehab units 
affordable to people in the lowest income category - those earning under $8000 annually -
were studios. The rest were a mix of one, two, and three bedroom units. By comparison, 
over 45 percent of the units affordable to households earning more than $24,000 annually 
were studios. 
Developers of housing for low-income Chicagoans struggle to both cover their 
debt and provide rents at levels which very poor people can afford. When DOH allocates 
their resources in a manner which further hinders the ability of developers to provide 
housing to low-income Chicagoans, the situation only becomes more desperate. 
The department also sometimes funds projects which provide rents that are already 
available on the unsubsidized market in the same neighborhood. These projects appear to 
subsidize developers, not affordable housing. Of course, the newly subsidized units are 
freshly rehabilitated and in many cases offer attractive amenities that may not be offered in 
apartments on the open market. The costs of creating high quality units may justify rents 
that are higher than most rents in the neighborhood. I do not intend to suggest that DOH 
is purposefully lining the pockets of developers. I do suggest that the department is 
choosing to allocate its funds to projects with relatively high rents. As a result, developers 
in some neighborhoods may be able to provide units of a higher quality than is generally 
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available on the market, but they also fail to provide housing for those most in need in the 
local neighborhood. My argument throughout the paper was that the department's 
subsidies, when so allocated, are misplaced. 
I also showed in Chapter 5 that the Department of Housing appears to provide 
much more generous loans to for-profit developers than to non-profit organizations, even 
on a per unit basis. I showed, moreover, that this disparity cannot be attributed to 
differences in the size of the units created. While 49 percent of the units created through 
the Multifamily Rehab and New Construction program in 1994 by non-profits were either 
studios or shelter beds, a full 60 percent of the units created by for-profit developers were 
studio units. Only 31 percent of the units created by for-profits contained two or more 
bedrooms, compared with 40 percent of the non-profit units. For-profit project costs, 
moreover, were higher than non-profit costs, even when we compare units of the same 
size. 
Since non-profits almost always provide housing affordable to the lowest income 
Chicagoans and for-profits almost always create more expensive housing, poor people are 
directly affected by the disparity in DOH allocations. 
Finally, a DOH program designed to encourage the rehabilitation of vacant 
buildings is often used to demolish property instead. The Chicago Abandoned Property 
Program (CAPP) has demolished four and a halftimes as many buildings as it has 
rehabbed since the program's inception. This policy is congruent with the drastic increase 
in demolitions conducted by the city in the 1990s. Such an approach merely facilitates the 
negative development cycle outlined in Chapter 2, a cyclical process of disinvestment and 
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gentrification which pads many wealthy pockets at the expense of the poor. 
In addition, I describe potential problems with the types of programs that DOH is 
employing to create affordable housing. In Chapter 4, I outlined my concerns regarding 
the department's three major programs - the Low Income Housing Trust Fund, the Low 
Income Housing Tax Credit, and the Multifamily Rehab and New Construction program. 
Together, these three programs accounted for 99.9 percent of all the units created by 
DOH in 1994 which were affordable to people earning under $15,000 annually and 93 
percent of all spending for "housing creation" programs in that year .. 
The Low Income Housing Trust Fund provided about 57 percent of all units 
created for people earning in the lowest income categories. The Trust Fund provides rent 
subsidies to privately managed projects for a period of one year. While property owners 
may apply for funding again in the next year, they are not required to do so. The Trust 
Fund, moreover, is not bound to renew the funding of previous beneficiaries. Hence, the 
housing produced through this program, while important, is highly vulnerable and cannot 
be seen as effectively counteracting the negative development cycle that I discussed in 
Chapter 2. When neighborhoods gentrify, rent prices increase. The Trust Fund board 
may drop particular projects as they become "too expensive" to subsidize. Even if the 
Trust Fund continues to subsidize low-income housing in gentrified neighborhoods, 
developers may choose not to apply for the subsidy at any time, opting instead to collect 
high rents from the upper-income tenants now living in the neighborhood. 
The Multifamily Rehab and New Construction program provides low-interest loans 
to developers of affordable housing. As I detailed in Chapter 4, though, the loans are not 
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generous enough to allow developers to both cover their debt and provide very low rents 
without accessing direct rental subsidies, usually Section 8. In 1994, 93 percent of all the 
units created by non-profits were affordable to people earning under $15,000 annually. 
Incredibly, a full 97 percent of all these very low-income units were created using Section 
8 money. The forced reliance of very low-income housing developers on Section 8 funds 
limits the types of projects which can be produced in important ways (see Chapter 3 for 
details). 
Multifamily Rehab and New Construction money is rarely combined with Low 
Income Housing Trust Fund rental subsidies, though such a combination would end 
developer's reliance on Section 8 funds. Because Trust Fund money is only guaranteed 
for one year, a loan package based upon the long-term use of these funds would be highly 
risky. Banks and other lenders do not take such risks. 
The Low Income Housing Tax Credit, as I discussed in Chapter 4, provides highly 
lucrative benefits to investors, who pay fifty cents to get a dollar written off of their taxes 
due, and also earn ownership interest in low-income properties. Properties funded 
through the program, moreover, are only guaranteed to remain affordable for fifteen years. 
Once this period has expired, investors of properties in gentrified areas may use their 
ownership interest to press for a sale. Since, at the writing of this thesis, the program has 
only existed for nine years, we cannot be sure whether investors will act in this way, but 
such behavior may occur if significant profits can be realized. 
Moreover, like Multifamily Rehab and New Construction projects, Tax Credit 
deals fail on their own to provide enough capital to allow developers to both cover their 
debt and provide very low rents. Developers are hamstrung as a result in ways very 
similar to those I described in relation to the Multifamily Rehab and New Construction 
program. 
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The problems I have detailed in this thesis show, I believe, that DOH is failing to 
allocate its resources in a way that would maximize, using existing funds, the creation of 
housing affordable to the people most in need in the city. In a variety of ways, DOH is 
choosing to administer and to distribute its resources in a manner which limits the impact 
on low-income neighborhoods. I suspect that, as Rich (1993) argues, local politics are a 
significant factor in determining how the city's housing programs are operated and what 
types of housing are produced. Mayor Daley's political base, while precariously including 
many Hispanics and lakefront liberals, is anchored in the conservative, white, middle-class 
sections of the city. Grimshaw (1992, p. 206-24) correctly points out, I believe, that the 
old Democratic machine is weakened enough, thanks mostly to Harold Washington's 
elections and tenure, that Daley must maintain at least a public image of concern for 
"reform" politics. As Washington's legacy fades and Daley continues to consolidate his 
political power, though, the mayor will be more able to reveal the more conservative 
social agenda inherent in his base constituency and his political roots. As Grimshaw (p. 
206-24) points out, a self-destructing African-American political community makes the 
mayor's job easier. 
Indeed, in the early autumn of 1995, Daley and his City Council supporters 
scrapped the relationship that the city had begun to develop with the Chicago Rehab 
Network after CRN's successful campaign in 1993 to increase city funding for affordable 
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housing. CRN was preparing its major aldermanic allies, including Ambrosio Medrano 
(the Hispanic chair of the Committee on Housing and Real Estate) and Arenda Troutman, 
a South Side African-American alderman, to introduce three ordinances in support oflow-
income community development. On the day the ordinances were to be introduced, pro-
Daley aldermen successfully pressured Medrano and Troutman to drop their support for 
CRN' s proposals. Later, the two aldermen introduced a new housing agenda for the city, 
as represented in a Daley-sponsored proposal which called for new DOH spending in 
support of housing for the middle-class. The Daley proposal was later passed by City 
Council, completing a dramatic reversal of the administration's earlier commitment to 
increase DOH spending for low-income people. The new programs created by this 
proposal will provide $75 million to families earning between $25,000 and nearly $72,000 
annually (Kass 1995, p. 1). In specially targetted neighborhoods, significant DOH 
subsidies will be offered to purchasers of single-family homes priced as high as $191, 000 
(Kass 1995, p. 1 ). 
The new programs seek to attract middle-class people into the city, especially into 
low-income neighborhoods. In so doing, city administers argue that they are effectively 
accomplishing the widely supported goal of creating stable, mixed-income communities. 
The programs, however, do not provide significant safegaurds to prevent the displacement 
of low-income people likely to result if the programs are successful in attracting the 
middle-class. As such, the DOH policies may facilitate, rather than hinder, the negative 
development cycle that I discussed in Chapter 2. The city is not spending its resources to 
improve low-income communities directly, a development method which both benefits the 
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current residents and improves the likelihood that wealthier people will move in. Rather, 
it is spending limited funds on middle-class people who are not in great need, arguing that 
development will not occur in low-income neighborhoods unless wealthier people can be 
attracted to them by generous subsidies. Mayor Daley's core political constituency is 
likely to appreciate this development policy, but the programs will likely assure that low-
income communities in Chicago will continue to either deteriorate or gentrify. 
The data presented in this thesis, moreover, shows that even before the new 
programs were introduced, the city was pursuing policies which did not benefit low-
income people as much as they might have. In the various ways I outlined earlier in this 
conclusion, my results may have provided forewarning of the city's lack of commitment to 
a low-income housing agenda. 
Clearly, local government plays a significant role in affordable housing production 
in the City of Chicago. While federal policies and expenditures continue to play a 
predominate role in state and city efforts to address housing problems, the importance of 
local government's power as the administrator and distributor of federal funds cannot be 
denied. Indeed, if the current Congress succeeds in passing its legislative agenda, local 
governments will have increased power over the remaining federal funds. As Williams 
(1980) found, local governmental control over outcomes is likely to increase as federal 
money arrives with decreased restrictions. Since Congress is also likely to cut federal 
spending on housing, cities and states will become even more important to affordable 
housing creation. As occurred in the 1980s, housing developers and activists are likely to 
press for creative, local financing mechanisms that may require the administrative and 
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political support of city government. 
My analysis reveals significant concerns with the current spending and 
adminstrative patterns of the Department of Housing. These concerns must be addressed 
in cooperation with local developers of low-income housing in Chicago if the increased 
power of city government in the near future is to translate into benefits for those 
Chicagoans most in need of housing assistance. 
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